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Since the last farm bill (the Food, Conservation and Energy Act of 2008) was enacted in May 2008,
the U.S. dairy industry has experienced major upheaval. The U.S. all-milk price in May 2008 was
$18.30/hundredweight; a year later it was $11.60. Given high feed costs, this price was below the cash
costs of producing milk for most, if not all, dairies in the United States. Moreover, the 37 percent fall-
off in the milk price was indicative of the enormous increase in price volatility observed over the last
15 years, putting milk prices and dairy profitability on a more-or-less constant roller coaster ride that
nearly all dairy market participants would like to see end.
Discussions about the dairy title of the next farm bill have already begun in Washington, DC, with this
backdrop of intensified concern among producers about the level and volatility of milk prices. Also
relevant to these discussions are anticipated federal spending constraints in the face of record budget
deficits and the growing global presence of dairy companies located in the U.S. In addition to propos-
ing alterations in existing federal dairy programs (including federal milk marketing orders, which are
not usually part of farm bill discussions), dairy groups are looking at brand new federal programs and
private initiatives to stabilize milk prices and provide a more effective price floor.
This report is intended to help sort through the myriad of dairy policy alternatives that will likely be
considered as the next farm bill process evolves. We provide a description of existing and potential
programs and policies that attempt to stabilize or support milk prices and identify issues relating to
their current and future deployment.
In brief:
Dairy price supports have been a fixture of federal dairy policy for more than 60 years. The ability of
price supports to maintain an effective price floor diminished as the support price was lowered and as
dairy product manufacturers became increasingly reluctant to sell product to the government. In some
cases, price supports have impeded U.S. dairy exports, distorted domestic markets, and constrained
dairy product innovation.
The federal Milk Income Loss Contract (MILC) program is relatively new, and provides income sup-
port rather than price support. MILC has supported dairy farmers’ incomes, but size-based limits on
payments have generated strong opposition from regions with predominantly larger herds.
Voluntary supply management, which offers a carrot to producers willing to cut milk production in
times of surplus, has been used only sparingly as a part of federal dairy policy. The Cooperatives
Working Together (CWT) herd retirement program is a new approach that is privately funded through
voluntary producer assessments. CWT has achieved success, but because assessments are not manda-
tory, there are issues related to free riders and the adequacy of funding.
Mandatory supply control uses a stick instead of a carrot to manage milk supplies, assessing penalties
on producers who exceed assigned production quotas or bases. Mandatory supply control is attractive
from a budgetary perspective because the milk price can be enhanced without payments to dairy farm-
ers. But quotas and bases inevitably take on value that raises production costs for new entrants or
farmers expanding their dairy herds and they can prevent efficient structural change and regional shifts
in milk production.
Federal and state milk marketing orders have regulated minimum milk prices since the 1930s. Mar-
keting orders are complex instruments that can significantly affect milk allocation and milk production
decisions. Orders use classified pricing and pooling to achieve their stated purpose of promoting or-
derly marketing. Pricing issues relate to the appropriate number of classes and how to set minimum
milk prices for manufacturing milk and price differentials for milk used for fluid products. Pooling is-
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sues include which dairy plants should be allowed to pool and how to promote equitable and effi-
cient inter-order movement of milk.
Finally, U.S. dairy trade policy does not directly affect milk prices in the same way as marketing
orders or the MILC program, but trade policy does influence the competitive environment for U.S.
exports and imports of dairy products. Greater exposure to world markets has brought an added
element of milk price instability to U.S. dairy markets. At the same time, foreign demand for dairy
products is expanding more rapidly than U.S. demand, offering an opportunity for accelerated
growth in U.S. milk production.
This report was authored by members of the FAPRI-UW Dairy Policy Analysis Alliance. It serves
as a companion to a related Alliance report titled, Dairy Policy Briefs, which consists of one-page
summaries of the material covered here.
The Alliance is a cooperative dairy policy research and outreach program between the Food and
Agricultural Policy Research Institute at the University of Missouri and the Department of Agri-
cultural and Applied Economics at the University of Wisconsin-Madison.
Alliance documents and other resources can be accessed and downloaded at either of the following
websites:
FAPRI site: (http://www.fapri.missouri.edu/)
University of Wisconsin Understanding Dairy Markets site: (http://www.aae.wisc.edu/future/).
If you would like additional information, please contact FAPRI or UW-Madison Alliance affiliates
at the following phone numbers or email addresses:
Scott Brown (573)882-3861 brownsc@missouri.edu
Bob Cropp (608)262-9483 racropp@wisc.edu
Brian W. Gould (608)263-3212 bwgould@wisc.edu
Ed Jesse (608)262-6348 evjesse@wisc.edu
Published by the Food and Agricultural Policy Research Institute (FAPRI), University of Missouri-Columbia,
101 Park DeVille Drive, Suite E, Columbia, MO 65203, and the Department of Agricultural and Applied Eco-
nomics, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Taylor Hall, 427 Lorch Street, Madison, WI 53706, April 2010.
Material in this publication is based upon work supported by the Cooperative State Research, Education and
Extension Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture, under Agreement No. 2009-34149-19825.
Any opinions, findings, conclusions, or recommendations expressed in this publication are those of the authors
and do not necessarily reflect the view of the U.S. Department of Agriculture.
Permission is granted to reproduce this information with appropriate attribution to the authors, the University of
Wisconsin-Madison and the Food and Agricultural Policy Research Institute, University of Missouri-Columbia.
April 2010
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Price supports for milk and dairy products used in
the United States represent a market intervention
program. The government offers to purchase non-
perishable dairy products (cheese, butter and nonfat
dry milk) from manufacturers at specified (interven-
tion) prices. The program is dormant when market
prices are above intervention prices. It is activated
when the supply of products exceeds demand at the
intervention prices, preventing market prices from
dropping to levels that would otherwise be necessary
to clear the excess supply.
Dairy price supports have been amended over time,
mainly to alter the way that the support price for
milk is determined and how corresponding product
prices are set and changed. Amajor change imple-
mented with passage of the 2008 Farm Bill elimi-
nated reference to supporting a milk price. Now,
purchase prices for cheese, butter and nonfat dry
milk are specified, but there is no longer a minimum
milk price target.
Public policy issues and concerns relating to dairy
price supports include:
• Effectiveness in establishing a realistic price floor
• Distortion in allocation of milk and relative product
prices
• Impact on U.S. dairy trade
Historical Review
Price supports for milk and dairy products have been
used continuously in the United States since passage
of the Agricultural Act of 1949. That Act required the
Secretary of Agriculture to support the price received
by dairy farmers for manufacturing use milk at be-
tween 75 percent and 90 percent of parity. The Secre-
tary determined the specific parity level within this
range by forecasting the adequacy of future milk pro-
duction in fulfilling market needs. Parity attempted
to keep the same relationship between milk prices
and farm costs as existed in the period 1910-14. The
parity formula used the Index of Prices Paid by farm-
ers to adjust the parity price for milk.
Using assumed yields and manufacturing costs, the
support price for manufacturing use milk was trans-
lated into prices per pound for three “hard” (i.e., non-
perishable) manufactured dairy products—cheddar
cheese, butter and nonfat dry milk—and USDA’s
Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) stood ready
to purchase unlimited quantities of these dairy prod-
ucts at the announced prices. Reasonably efficient
plants making and selling cheese, butter and nonfat
dry milk at the purchase prices would, in theory,
have enough money to pay farmers the announced
support price for milk. And competition among
plants would force those plants manufacturing other
dairy products to also pay the support price or risk
losing their milk supply.
As long as milk supply and demand were in balance
and market prices stayed above CCC purchase
prices, the support program was inactive. But during
periods of surplus milk production, milk in excess of
fluid and fresh product needs would increasingly be
diverted to plants making nonperishable products.
Larger supplies of cheese, butter and nonfat dry milk
would lower their market prices, triggering govern-
ment sales if and when market prices fell below CCC
purchase prices.
The 1949 Agricultural Act has been amended many
times, most commonly through omnibus farm bills.
A critical amendment that proved very disruptive and
costly was in the 1973 Agricultural and Consumer
Protection Act, which raised the minimum support
level from 75 percent to 80 percent of parity. The
subsequent farm bill (the Food and Agriculture Act
of 1977) continued the minimum support level of 80
percent of parity through April 1, 1981 and required
that the support price be adjusted semi-annually
(October 1 and April 1) to reflect changes in the
parity formula.
High rates of inflation during the 1970s—plus the
fact that the parity formula ignored changes in pro-
ductivity at the farm—resulted in the support price
increasing from $4.28 per hundredweight on October
1, 1970, to $13.10 per hundredweight on October
1,1980 (see figure)1. Dairy farmers responded to
rapidly-increasing support prices by increasing milk
production far beyond commercial use. Surplus dairy
products purchased by the CCC under the support
program approached the equivalent of 10 percent of
all farm milk marketed and associated government
costs reached $2.7 billion in 1983 (see figures on
following page.)
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Support Price for Milk*
Budget Cost for Dairy Price Supports
This unprecedented surplus situation resulted in
major changes in the support program. The Agricul-
ture and Food Act of 1981 removed the milk support
price from parity, instead tying it to the level of CCC
purchases and associated net government costs of the
program. Under this and subsequent amendments,
the support price was gradually ratcheted down to
$9.90 per hundredweight.
The Food, Agriculture, Conversation and Trade Act
of 1990 required termination of the program on De-
cember 31,1999. Subsequent legislation extended the
program until May 2002, when the Farm Security
and Rural Investment Act of 2002 reinstated the
price program through 2007 at the $9.90 per hun-
dredweight support level then in effect.
The Current Price Support Program
The 2008 Food, Conservation and Energy Act made
another major change in the federal dairy price sup-
port program. What was the Milk Price Support Pro-
gram was renamed the Dairy Product Price Support
Program. USDA still commits to purchasing cheddar
cheese, butter and nonfat dry milk, but the CCC pur-
chase prices for these products are no longer linked
to a specified support price per hundredweight of
manufacturing milk.
The CCC purchase prices specified in current legisla-
tion are: butter–$1.05 per pound; block cheddar
cheese–$1.13 per pound; barrel cheddar cheese–
$1.10 per pound; and nonfat dry milk–$0.80 per
pound. These prices are the same as what were
linked to the $9.90 milk support price in previous
legislation. When the current purchase prices are
inserted into federal milk marketing order formulas
used for calculating minimum prices for milk used
for cheese (Class III) and butter and nonfat dry milk
(Class IV), they yield milk prices of $9.50 and $9.33
per hundredweight, respectively.2
Under current law, purchase prices may be reduced if
CCC net removals of product exceed specified levels
for 12 consecutive months.3 These trigger inventory
levels are large compared to recent net removals and
are not expected to alter purchase prices during the
life of the 2008 Act (expires December 2012).
Commodities purchased by CCC can be re-sold at
market prices prevailing at the time of sale as long as
market prices are at least 110 percent of the purchase
price at the time the commodity was acquired. Sales
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Government Purchases of Dairy Products
back into commercial markets are called unrestricted
sales.
Besides making unrestricted sales when market
prices warrant, the CCC makes surplus dairy prod-
ucts available for use in several domestic and foreign
food programs. Most of these special programs only
provide dairy products on an “as available” basis;
that is, donations are made only if there are stocks
available to donate. The CCC has also held fire sales
of nonfat dry milk for cattle feed and for manufactur-
ing milk protein concentrate when stocks were espe-
cially burdensome.
While the change from supporting a milk price to
supporting prices for dairy products may seem sub-
tle, it could have significant implications for U.S.
conformance with World Trade Organization (WTO)
rules. Even though there were few CCC purchases of
surplus dairy products between 2004 and 2007, the
WTO still scores the dairy support program as a
major trade-distorting domestic subsidy to dairy
farmers. The WTO calculates domestic farm subsi-
dies for a country by using a value called the Aggre-
gate Measure of Support (AMS). Computing AMS
for marketing intervention programs involves com-
paring supported prices with world market prices.
Under the current WTO agreement (the 1994
Uruguay Round), the contribution of the dairy price
support program to AMS is measured as the differ-
ence between the $9.90 per hundredweight support
price and a world price of $7.25 per hundredweight
(average price for 1986-88) multiplied by total U.S.
milk production. For 2008, the dairy AMS calcula-
tion yields $5 billion ($2.65 per hundredweight X 1.9
billion hundredweight of milk). The AMS upper limit
for all of U.S. agriculture is $19.1 billion annually,
which means that the dairy price support program
alone contributed more than 25 percent to this limit.
Supporting product prices instead of milk prices is an
attempt to reduce dairy’s contribution to the WTO
calculation of AMS for the United States. Using
1986-88 world market prices for cheddar cheese,
butter and nonfat dry milk, we estimate that the cur-
rent support program would contribute only about $3
billion to AMS. More recent base year prices that
would be used in any new WTO agreement would
generate much smaller AMS contributions.
Another major difference between supporting a spe-
cific milk price and supporting dairy product prices
has to do with alignment of CCC purchase prices for
butter and nonfat dry milk. Under current law, the
Secretary can reduce the purchase prices for cheese,
butter or nonfat dry milk if accumulated purchases of
any of these products exceed trigger levels. The Sec-
retary is not obligated to consider the impact on milk
prices or to maintain relative price relationships.
This authority replaces language in farm bills dating
to 1990 that instructed the Secretary to use butter-
powder “tilts”— altering the relative CCC purchase
prices for butter and nonfat dry milk — to minimize
the public cost of the support program. Under previ-
ous versions of the dairy price support program,
butter and nonfat dry milk were considered joint
products and the combined net revenue from sales
of butter and nonfat dry milk made from a hundred-
weight of milk was intended to yield the milk sup-
port price. So the purchase price of one product (e.g.,
butter) could only be lowered if the purchase price of
the other product (nonfat dry milk) were increased
enough to offset the reduced revenue
In the early 1990s, butter was in surplus relative to
nonfat dry milk. Four tilts were made between April
1990 and July 1993, when the support price was
constant at $10.10 per hundredweight. The butter
purchase price was decreased from $1.0925 to $0.65
per pound and the nonfat dry milk price was corre-
spondingly increased from $0.79 to $1.034 per
pound in order to maintain the $10.10 per hundred-
weight value for milk used to make butter and nonfat
dry milk.
Beginning in 2000, nonfat dry milk was in surplus
relative to butter and the Secretary implemented two
tilts, reducing the support price for nonfat dry milk
from $1.032 to $0.80 per pound and correspondingly
increasing the support price for butter from $0.6549
to $1.05 per pound in order to maintain the $9.90 per
hundredweight support price then in effect.
The lowering of the nonfat dry milk price was very
contentious because of its effect on the minimum
price of milk used to make fluid dairy products.4
Under the Dairy Product Price Support Program,
CCC purchase prices for cheese, butter and nonfat
dry milk are no longer tied to a milk support price.
So if butter were in surplus relative to nonfat dry
milk, for example, the CCC purchase price for butter
may be lowered without increasing the purchase
price for nonfat dry milk. The controversial issue of
butter-powder tilts no longer exists.
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Dairy Price Support Issues
Flooring milk prices. Dairy price supports have not
always been successful in keeping dairy product
prices above CCC purchase prices or in flooring
farm milk prices when that was a direct program ob-
jective. For example, during the 48-month period
January 2000 to December 2003, the Class III price
was below the support price in 17 months, with the
gap as large as $1.23 per hundredweight. During Jan-
uary 2009, the CME block cheddar cheese price av-
eraged $1.07 per pound and reached as low as $1.04.
These prices were well below the CCC block ched-
dar cheese price of $1.13 per pound.
Because of product, packaging, payment and other
specifications that do not meet industry standards,
it costs more to sell products to the government than
to commercial buyers. This is a particular problem
for cheese and butter; less so for nonfat dry milk.
So market prices for the products that are purchased
under the Dairy Products Price Support Program
need to be less than intervention prices in order t
o offset the difference in costs and trigger CCC
purchases.
There are several ways of correcting this problem. A
direct way is to simply raise the intervention prices
enough to offset the higher costs of selling product to
the CCC. This would require monitoring of cost dif-
ferences and making periodic changes in CCC pur-
chase prices, adding administrative burden to the
DPPSP. Moreover, higher selling costs are not likely
the only reason market prices fall below CCC pur-
chase prices, so raising purchase prices would not
guarantee the problem would be corrected.
Another option, at least in areas regulated by federal
milk marketing orders, is to “snub” the butter,
cheese, and nonfat dry milk prices used in federal
order Class III and Class IV pricing formulas at the
CCC purchase prices. In other words, if in any month
a NASS product price used in the formulas were less
than CCC prices, the formula would use the higher
CCC price. This option was used in the California
milk pricing system for about a two-year period be-
ginning April 1, 2003. California 4a (butter-powder)
and 4b (cheese) pricing formulas used the higher of
market prices or CCC purchase prices for butter,
nonfat dry milk, and cheese.5
Snubbing formula product prices would be a very ef-
fective way to prevent market prices less than sup-
port from negatively affecting federal order mini-
mum Class III and Class IV prices. However, snub-
bing would not prevent market prices for cheese and
other CCC products from falling below CCC pur-
chase prices by at least the difference in selling costs
between commercial and CCC sales. Consequently,
manufacturers would object strongly to this option.
They would legitimately argue that their margins
were being squeezed whenever CME prices were
less than CCC prices. Snubbing would place a partic-
ular hardship on smaller plants that are not in a posi-
tion to sell to the CCC.
A third way to solidify DPPSP price floors is to have
the CCC participate as a trader on the CME or con-
tract with CME brokers to place an irrevocable bid
(offer to purchase) for block cheese, butter and non-
fat dry milk on the CME at announced CCC pur-
chase prices. CCC product, delivery, and payment
specifications would need to be modified to more
closely match those of the CME. To the extent that is
impractical or impossible under USDA rules, then
the CCC would have to equalize net sales prices be-
tween CCC and CME sales, probably through premi-
ums that offset these costs. Any offers to sell at the
standing bid would be accepted by the CCC. Under
CME trading rules, there can be no sales or offers to
sell at a price below the standing bid. Hence, this op-
tion would place an absolute floor on CME prices at
the CCC purchase prices.
While this option would effectively floor CME
prices, it may not floor the NASS survey prices used
in Class III and Class IV pricing formulas. For exam-
ple, the relationship between CME and NASS cheese
prices has been very tight because most cheese is
sold through pricing formulas tied to CME prices.
But there is a possibility that these sales contracts
could be altered if the CCC were a buyer on the
CME. Buyers might use larger discounts or smaller
premiums when CME prices reached floors that re-
sulted in. In that event, NASS commodity prices
could end up lower than CCC prices.
Market price distortions. Dairy price supports have
affected milk utilization by setting a price floor for
some commodities but not for others. Perhaps the
best example of this market distortion relates to non-
fat dry milk. Nonfat dry milk is a source of dairy
protein in many food applications. There is a large
U.S. market for other dairy-based proteins, notably
milk protein concentrate (MPC) and casein. Most of
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the MPC and nearly all of the casein used in the U.S.
comes from imports.6 Because nonfat dry milk is pur-
chased by the CCC at a minimum price, it is often
more profitable and less risky to produce nonfat dry
milk than other forms of dairy proteins. U.S. produc-
tion of whole milk powder (WMP) is similarly af-
fected by the DPPSP standing ready to purchase
unlimited quantities of nonfat dry milk. WMP is a
major world dairy export product, but little is pro-
duced in the U.S.
The narrow line of homogeneous dry milk products
stands in vivid contrast to the broad spectrum of whey
products manufactured in the U.S. for domestic and
export use. Whey protein has become essentially a
“made to spec” product tailored to individualized
uses. Whey is also converted to specialized lactose
products. Not coincidentally, whey is not purchased
under the DPPSP.
While the evidence is less clear, the DPPSP may also
affect the mix of cheeses produced in the U.S. Ched-
dar cheese accounted for about a third of total U.S.
cheese production in 2009. Obviously, cheddar cheese
demand heavily influences how much is manufac-
tured. But both absolute production and the styles of
cheddar being produced may be influenced by the
ability to sell cheese to the CCC.
U.S. dairy export effects. Prior to 2006, world prices
for cheese, butter and nonfat dry milk were often
below CCC purchase prices. This was primarily the
result of limited world trade in dairy products and, for
what trade there was, large EU export subsidies that
kept prices low. Consequently, selling to the CCC was
usually a more lucrative market than exporting.
During most of 2006-2008, world dairy market prices
exceeded CCC purchase prices and the U.S. enjoyed
a dairy export boom. Purchase prices are currently
low by historical standards and they cannot be in-
creased under existing law. Consequently, on average,
export markets are expected to be more attractive to
U.S manufacturers than selling cheese, butter and
nonfat dry milk to the CCC over the long term.
But averages hide world market downsides. With the
dairy price support program in effect, manufacturers
shift their allegiance from export sales to CCC sales
when world market prices dip far enough below CCC
prices. This tends to make the United States an unreli-
able supplier to world markets.
Endnotes
1Milk price support levels noted here are for milk of average
butterfat content (3.67 percent).
2The Class III price includes a value for dry whey, which is
not purchased by the CCC. The Class III value noted here as-
sumes a dry whey price of 19.11 cents per pound, which is
equal to the whey make allowance in the Class III price for-
mula. For every penny per pound that the whey price exceeds
19.11 cents, the supported Class III price would be higher by
5.8 cents per hundredweight
3Net removals under the 2008 Act are defined as CCC pur-
chases plus Dairy Export Incentive Program (DEIP) removals
minus unrestricted sales.
4 See paper on federal milk marketing orders.
5 Market prices under the California pricing system are defined
as: CME butter, CME block cheddar cheese, California Grade
A and Extra Grade nonfat dry milk, and Western dry whey.
Federal orders use NASS prices for these four commodities.
6 U.S. production of MPC was reported by USDA for the first
time in 2009, and measured about 92 million pounds. MPC im-
ports in 2009 were 114 million pounds. U.S. production of
MPC is believed to have increased from near zero ten years
ago, while imported MPC has declined 40 percent from 2005-
2007 levels. U.S. casein production is not reported by USDA.
In 2009, imports of casein and caseinates totaled 160 million
pounds.
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The Milk Income Loss Contract (MILC) program is
a target price-deficiency payment program that
makes direct payments to dairy farmers when milk
prices fall below specified target levels. MILC was
first authorized in the Farm Security and Rural In-
vestment Act of 2002 (the 2002 farm bill) and ex-
tended through annual appropriations bills and the
Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008 (the
2008 farm bill). Since it began through 2009, the
program has made payments of $3.5 billion to U.S.
dairy producers. Individual farm payments are lim-
ited by a cap on annual production eligible for pay-
ment. This has made the program unpopular in
regions with larger herds. The program has also been
criticized for extending the length of low price peri-
ods and causing larger dairies to bear the brunt of
supply adjustments.
Historical Review
MILC is the product of a political compromise dur-
ing passage of the 2002 farm bill. Members of Con-
gress from the Northeast attempted to reinstate the
Northeast Interstate Dairy Compact, which had ex-
pired in November 2001, in the 2002 farm bill. This
attempt was fought by legislators from the Midwest.
The Senate version of the Dairy Title of the new Bill
contained a reincarnated compact applicable only to
the New England states and a different target price-
deficiency payment program applicable to the rest of
the country.
In the New England variant, the target price was the
$16.94 per hundredweight compact target. If the
Boston Class I price in any month was less than the
target price, then producers in the New England
states would receive 45 percent of the difference on
their entire monthly milk deliveries regardless of
how the milk was utilized.1 In House-Senate confer-
ence, the wisdom of having disparate regional pro-
grams was called into question, and what ultimately
emerged was the New England plan applied nation-
ally with production caps—all milk marketed in the
U.S. was eligible to receive the deficiency payment.
The program was made retroactive to December
2001. Milk prices had fallen sharply in the fall of
2001, yielding MILC payments during the first
month the program was in effect.
The MILC program was authorized with a unique
method of limiting individual farm payments. Instead
of using a dollar-denominated payment limitation as
Milk Income Loss Contract (MILC) Program
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in most farm programs, the MILC program imposed
a limit on milk marketings eligible for payment dur-
ing any fiscal year. The cap was initially set at 2.4
million pounds, the annual production from a herd of
100-150 cows, depending on milk yield per cow.
Producers could sign up to begin receiving payments
any month during a fiscal year (October-September)
and receive payments from that month until market-
ings for which MILC payments had been received
reached the cap or the end of the fiscal year. Market-
ings during any month in which there was not a
MILC payment did not count against the cap.
In the 2002 farm bill, the MILC program was only
authorized through September 2005. The program
was extended in the fall of 2005 through the life of
the bill. The extension renamed the program MILC-
X and reduced the payment rate from 45 percent to
34 percent of the difference between $16.94 and the
Boston Class I price.
The MILC name and initial payment rate were rein-
stated in the 2008 farm bill. Other significant
changes to this program were “floating” the target
price in accordance with changes in feed prices and
raising the payment cap from 2.4 million pounds to
2.985 million pounds.
Since it began, the MILC program has made pay-
ments of about $3.5 billion. More than half of total
payments were made in the first two years the pro-
gram was in effect. No payments were made in
FY2008 and practically none in FY2005.
From the program’s inception, MILC payments per
hundredweight increased steadily through an ex-
tended period of low milk prices that finally ended in
late 2002. Payments were made every month of
2006. The longest period of no payments was 23
months—March 2007 through January 2009. The
largest monthly payment was just over $2 per hun-
dredweight in March 2009, when the Boston Class I
price dipped to $12.68 and relatively high feed prices
elevated the target price to $17.14.
The Current MILC Program
The current MILC program consists of the following
elements, which apply to the period October 1, 2008
through August 31, 2012:
• The target price is a minimum of $16.94 per hun-
dredweight. The target price is increased if feed
prices exceed a base level as noted below.
• The target price is compared to the monthly Boston
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Class I price. If the Boston Class I price is less
than the target price, then all producers are eligible
to receive a deficiency payment of 45 percent of
the difference.
• Producers can receive payment on no more than
2.985 million pounds of milk marketed in any fiscal
year (October-September). Producers can specify
which month during the fiscal year they want to
begin receiving MILC payments. Once payments
begin, marketings during any month that payments
are made count against the cap. The default month to
begin receiving payments is October. Once enrolled
in the MILC program a producer cannot withdraw
from the program and then re-enroll during the same
fiscal year.
On September 1, 2012 (unless altered by a new farm
bill or other legislation), the payment rate is reduced
from 45 percent to 34 percent and the production cap
is reduced from 2.985 million pounds to 2.4 million
pounds.
The feed price adjustment to the target price is based
on the cost of a standard dairy ration, referred to as
the National Average Dairy Feed Cost. This feed cost
is the estimated cost per hundredweight of a 16 per-
cent protein dairy consisting of 51 pounds of corn, 8
pounds of soybeans and 41 pounds of alfalfa hay.2 In
any month the National Dairy Feed Cost is above a
specified base of $7.35 per hundredweight, the target
price is increased by a percentage equal to 45 percent
of the percentage difference between the National
Dairy Feed Cost and $7.35. The base is increased
from $7.35 to $9.50 in September 2012.
Prices for the feeds making up the National Dairy
Feed Cost are the final U.S. average prices reported
by USDA in Agricultural Prices. This results in a
two-month delay in calculating MILC payments,
since USDA does not report final estimates for a
month until the end of the following month.
An example may clarify calculation of the feed price
adjuster. Suppose that for a given month USDA re-
ported final estimates of U.S. average prices for corn,
soybeans, and hay of $4.00 per bushel for corn, $10
per bushel for soybeans, and $150 per ton for baled
alfalfa hay. Using the weights noted above and
bushel weights of 56 pounds for corn and 60 pounds
for soybeans, these feed prices yield a National Dairy
Feed Cost of $8.04 per hundredweight:
Corn:
($4.00/bu divided by 56 lb) = $0.071/ lb X 51 lb = $3.62
Soybeans:
($10.00/bu divided by 60 lb) = $0.167/ lb X 8 lb = $1.34
Alfalfa Hay:
($150/ton divided by 2000 lb) = $0.075/ lb X 41 lb = $3.08
Total value = $8.04
Based on the value of the National Dairy Feed Cost, the
adjusted MILC target price is calculated as follows:
($8.04 - $7.35)/$7.35 = 9.8% over base
9.8% X 45% = 4.4% feed adjuster increase
($16.94 X 1.044) = $17.69 target price.
MILC Program Issues
Distribution of Program Benefits
The most controversial feature of the MILC
program since its inception has been the individual
producer cap on annual milk production eligible for
payment. Opposition to the cap has come from large
producers, some large enough to exhaust their 2.985
million pound cap in less than a month, and, politi-
cally, from regions like the West where large dairy
herds dominate.
Differences in average dairy farm size and productiv-
ity across states do, indeed, affect the regional distri-
bution of benefits from the MILC program. The table
below shows dairy herd size and milk yield for the
twenty largest dairy states. Average number of cows
per herd in 2007 ranged from 66 (Pennsylvania) to
more than 1,000 (New Mexico and Arizona). The
percent of dairy farms with herds larger than 200
cows ranged from less than 10 percent in many states
to 70 percent in California. The range in annual milk
production per cow was from less than 17,000
pounds (Florida) to more than 23,000 pounds.
The last column of the table, labeled critical herd
size, shows the maximum herd size in the twenty
states that would be eligible to receive full benefits if
MILC payments were made every month. Because of
differences in per cow productivity, the critical herd
size varies from fewer than 130 cows in Arizona and
Washington to almost 180 cows in Florida. In gen-
eral, there is a positive correlation between critical
herd size and average herd size, meaning that states
with the largest percentage of herds likely to exceed
the eligibility cap would also exceed the cap with the
fewest number of cows.
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The impact of varying herd size on receipt of milk
payments by state is shown in the following table.
The second and third column show calendar year
2009 milk production and the percentage of total
U.S. production it represents. The third and fourth
columns show fiscal year 2009 MILC payments for
the state and share of total U.S. payments. The last
column, denoted discrepancy ratio, is the percent of
MILC payments for the state divided by the percent
of milk production. The lower the discrepancy ratio,
the smaller the share of benefits relative to what
would have been received if benefits had been dis-
tributed in proportion to production.
The MILC program clearly provides disproportionate
benefits to states and regions with smaller-sized
herds. While this could be interpreted as discrimina-
tory, payment limitations are a fixture of government
agricultural programs, some involving income means
tests and some absolute dollar limits. What makes
the MILC cap unusual is the more visible regional
impact because milk production is so broadly dis-
persed compared to the more concentrated produc-
tion of many crops subject to program payment
limitations.
Milk Avg. % of Herds Critical
State Herds Cows per Cow Herd Size over 200 cows Herd Size**
No. 1,000 Lbs/Year No. % No.
California 2,200 1,813 22,440 824.1 70% 133
Wisconsin 14,200 1,247 19,310 87.8 8% 155
New York 5,700 627 19,303 110.0 10% 155
Idaho 810 513 22,513 633.3 42% 133
Pennsylvania 8,300 550 19,422 66.3 4% 154
Minnesota 5,100 460 18,817 90.2 7% 159
Texas 1,300 389 18,982 299.2 26% 157
Michigan 2,700 335 22,761 124.1 14% 131
New Mexico 270 332 21,958 1,229.6 54% 136
Washington 820 238 23,239 290.2 33% 128
Ohio 3,700 275 18,109 74.3 5% 165
Iowa 2,400 213 20,085 88.8 7% 149
Arizona 180 181 23,260 1,005.6 42% 128
Indiana 2,000 166 20,307 83.0 6% 147
Colorado 450 118 22,932 262.2 21% 130
Kansas 780 110 19,882 141.0 7% 150
Vermont 1,200 140 18,079 116.7 14% 165
Oregon 600 115 19,417 191.7 22% 154
Florida 420 125 16,832 297.6 26% 177
Illinois 1,200 103 18,612 85.8 8% 160
United States 69,995 9,189 20,204 131.3 11% 148
*Ranked by milk production in 2009. State herd numbers and size distribution last published by USDA for 2007.
**Current MILC payment eligibility cap (2.985 million pounds) divided by milk yield per cow
Source: USDA-NASS
Herd Size and Annual Milk Yield per Cow, Top 20 Dairy States, 2007*
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To its credit, the production eligibility cap is a very
effective means of capping farm payments compared
to dollar-denominated payment limitations. Informa-
tion is readily available through dairy plant records
to monitor milk deliveries and impose caps. Evading
the payment limit is difficult if not impossible.
The question of whether the MILC production cap is
“fair” is partly tied to its role as establishing the only
real price floor for dairy farmers (even though MILC
is technically an income support program; not a
mechanism to floor milk prices). The dairy price sup-
port program once served that purpose, but the sup-
port price for milk was ratcheted down over time to a
level that ended up well below production costs for
nearly all dairy farmers, especially given today’s
feed costs. And there is currently no milk price floor
established under the Dairy Product Price Support
Program. So an argument could be made that if
MILC is the only mechanism that will be used to es-
tablish a floor price, then the floor should be more
level.
Discrepancy
State CY2009 Milk Production FY2009 MILC Payments Ratio**
Million Lbs % of U.S. $Million % of U.S.
California 39,512 20.9% 84.80 10.3% 0.5
Wisconsin 25,239 13.3% 175.01 21.3% 1.6
New York 12,424 6.6% 73.16 8.9% 1.4
Idaho 12,150 6.4% 18.59 2.3% 0.4
Pennsylvania 10,551 5.6% 69.01 8.4% 1.5
Minnesota 9,019 4.8% 66.27 8.1% 1.7
Texas 8,840 4.7% 20.82 2.5% 0.5
Michigan 7,968 4.2% 38.50 4.7% 1.1
New Mexico 7,904 4.2% 8.52 1.0% 0.2
Washington 5,561 2.9% 15.34 1.9% 0.6
Ohio 5,192 2.7% 30.09 3.7% 1.3
Iowa 4,379 2.3% 27.53 3.3% 1.4
Arizona 4,076 2.2% 4.75 0.6% 0.3
Indiana 3,383 1.8% 12.99 1.6% 0.9
Colorado 2,840 1.5% 5.23 0.6% 0.4
Kansas 2,488 1.3% 6.31 0.8% 0.6
Vermont 2,469 1.3% 17.72 2.2% 1.7
Oregon 2,248 1.2% 8.50 1.0% 0.9
Florida 2,077 1.1% 4.79 0.6% 0.5
Illinois 1,925 1.0% 14.37 1.7% 1.7
United States 189,320 100.0% 822.37 100.0% 1.0
*Ranked by 2009 milk production.
**Percent of total MILC payments divided by percent of total milk production.
Source: USDA-NASS and USDA-FSA.
Milk Production versus MILC Payments, Top 20 Dairy States*
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Supply Impacts
While the purpose of the MILC program is to pro-
vide income protection to dairy farmers, most dairy
farmers likely view MILC payments as an augmenta-
tion of their milk price rather than a decoupled in-
come supplement. Accordingly, the MILC program
has been criticized by some for lengthening the pe-
riod of supply adjustment to low milk prices by im-
plicitly raising prices, thus impeding or preventing
the “natural selection process” of attrition that occurs
in response to sustained low milk prices.
The argument behind this criticism is that operators
of smaller dairy farms whose payments are not
capped would be the most likely to exit the industry
when milk prices are low. Since smaller dairies
receive maximum MILC payments, they are able
to stay in business. Moreover, the argument goes,
operators of large dairies receive only a fraction
of the per hundredweight MILC payments going
to small dairies (a smaller milk price augmentation).
Therefore they are forced to bear the brunt of
supply adjustment.
While this argument is plausible, the assumption
that, absent MILC payments, smaller dairy farms
would be the first to go is questionable. There are
many factors that determine financial vulnerability.
Important determinants are debt load and debt-to-
equity ratios. USDA-ERS dairy balance sheet data
indicate that smaller dairy farmers carry less debt per
dollar of assets and have a lower debt-to-equity ratio
than larger dairy farmers.3 Hence, it seems unlikely
that smaller farmers are more likely to be forced out
of business from foreclosure than large farmers.
Composition of the Feed Price Adjuster
The feed composition and the weights applied to
corn, soybeans and alfalfa hay are subject to ques-
tion. Few dairies include soybeans directly in their
dairy ration, instead using soybean meal or other
oilseed meals as a source of protein. Prices for soy-
bean and other oilseed meals are highly correlated
with the U.S. average soybean price, but the small
weight on soybeans may not match the use of high
protein meals in dairy rations. Similarly, while dry
alfalfa hay is common in dairy rations, corn silage
is extensively used in many parts of the United
States. The value of corn silage would be more
highly correlated with corn prices than alfalfa hay
prices. Moreover, while the use of a single feed price
adjustor is likely necessary for purposes of adminis-
tration, it ignores significant regional differences in
feed rations and feeding rates.
Delay in Calculating Feed Cost Adjuster
Using the feed price adjuster makes the MILC pro-
gram more sensitive to cost side changes in dairy
profitability, but the way it is calculated has created a
delay in calculating MILC payments.
The monthly feed cost adjuster used to increase the
MILC target price is based on USDA-NASS final es-
timates of U.S. average corn, soybean and baled al-
falfa hay prices. These estimates are reported in the
monthly Agriculture Prices report published by the
USDA near the end of each month.
Agricultural Prices reports preliminary estimates of
the prices making up the feed cost adjuster at the end
of the current month. For example, preliminary corn,
soybean and hay prices for the month of March 2010
were reported on March 30. Final estimates are re-
ported at the end of the following month, e.g. March
2010 final estimates were reported April 30. This
means that the feed price adjusted MILC target price
is not known until the end of the month following the
month it applies, e.g., the March 2010 target price
could not be reported until April 30.
Federal Order Class I prices are announced on the
Friday on or before the 23rd of the month before
they apply. The March 2010 Boston Class I price was
announced on February 19. So the reference price in
the calculation of the March 2010 MILC payment
was known 10 weeks before the target price.
Prior to adoption of the feed price adjuster, MILC
payment rates were known as soon as the Boston
Class I price was announced, which was several
days before the month the rates applied. Currently,
payments are not known until the end of the month
following the month they apply, delaying the ac-
counting and payment process.
This lag could be shortened by using preliminary
NASS estimates of feed prices. Historically, differ-
ences between preliminary and final feed cost esti-
mates have been small. But revisions have become
larger on average with higher and more volatile corn
and soybean prices in recent years.
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Using preliminary feed prices would result in poten-
tial underpayment of producers in months when final
feed price estimates exceeded preliminary estimates
and possible overpayment if the opposite occurred.
Over time, downward price adjustments would be
expected to offset upward adjustments. But offsets
would not likely match the timing of MILC payment
months—for example positive revisions might occur
mostly in months when no payments are made.
USDA could adjust subsequent payments if feed
price revisions resulted in over- or under-payments
for a given month. But adjustments could not be
made for several months if prices stayed above
the target.
Soft Price Floor
The current MILC program pays out 45 percent of
the difference between the feed price adjusted target
price and the Boston Class I price. Especially in light
of recent low milk prices, some question whether the
program always offers an acceptable safety net for
dairy producers.
The decision to use $16.94 per hundredweight in ref-
erence to the Boston Class I price is the main reason
for the 45 percent payout factor. A payout factor of
100 percent would have resulted in a level of support
above average price levels since the program’s incep-
tion, considerably higher than what many might
think is a reasonable safety net. Using a 100 percent
payout factor would have resulted in very high gov-
ernment costs. Given budget constraints, the price
floor can be made more solid only by setting a lower
target price, perhaps in reference to some percentage
of a moving national average all-milk price or the
federal order Class III price.
Simply put and ignoring the production cap, once the
Boston class I price falls below the feed-adjusted
trigger level, producers only recoup 45 percent of the
decline in market receipts from the MILC direct pay-
ments. That is, they still see lower overall receipts as
prices decline from the trigger level.
This raises the question of whether a better option
would be a sliding payout factor that increased the
further the market price fell below the target price.
Alternatively, once the market price fell to a speci-
fied minimum level, the program could compensate
100 percent of the difference between that level and
the market price. Choosing a price floor would be a
critical decision in order to avoid interference with
market signals. Given the variability in production
costs today, the price floor may need to be adjusted
regularly to avoid the over-supply situation that
excessively high support price levels created in the
1980s or the under-supply situation that could unfold
if production costs continue their rise of the past
few years.
Endnotes
1Under the compact, Class I handlers paid the full difference
between $16.94 and the Boston Class I price into a compact
pool, which was distributed to all producers in proportion to
their monthly total milk marketings. Since Class I utilization
in the compact area was about 45 percent, in effect, MILC re-
produced the compact.
2For a spreadsheet model that shows the MILC feed adjuster
refer to the following URL located within the University of
Wisconsin Understanding Dairy Markets website: http://fu-
ture.aae.wisc.edu/
3For state level balance sheet data, see:
http://www.ers.usda.gov/Data/ARMS/StatesOverview.htm
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Government-sponsored voluntary supply management
has been used infrequently in the U.S. dairy industry.
Programs used in the mid-1980s involved paying
dairy farmers to reduce milk production or exit dairy
farming. After much of the burdensome supplies of
the 1980s were controlled, there were no programs
that allowed producers to voluntarily cut supplies in
exchange for incentives. In July 2003, a private vol-
untary supply management program was initiated by
the National Milk Producers Federation. The Cooper-
atives Working Together, or CWT, program periodi-
cally solicits bids from eligible dairy farmers (those
paying an assessment) representing how much per
hundredweight of base production they are willing to
accept to slaughter their dairy herds. Through the end
of 2009, there have been nine CWT herd retirement
rounds and participating producers are currently
signed up through the end of 2010 to pay an assess-
ment of 10 cents per cwt of milk marketed.
Historical Review
Voluntary supply management involves a “carrot” ap-
proach to keeping supply in line with consumption in
order to achieve satisfactory farm-level prices. In a
generic sense, voluntary supply management pro-
grams pay producers to cut back production or go out
of business. Willing producers participate; others are
not obligated to.
Prior to the 21st century, voluntary supply manage-
ment had been used only twice in the U.S dairy sector,
both within a short period of time in the mid-1980s.
This period was characterized by massive overproduc-
tion of milk, which resulted in government purchase
costs under the dairy price support program in excess
of $2 billion per year.
To help reduce the milk supply, Congress authorized
the Milk Diversion Program in 1983. Under this pro-
gram, dairy farmers who agreed to reduce their milk
marketings by 5 to 30 percent from their base level
were paid $10 per hundredweight on the reduced mar-
ketings. The program was funded in part by assess-
ments on all milk producers and in part by
government funds.
The Milk Diversion Program cut milk production
sharply in 1984, but it had no long-term effect—U.S.
milk production in 1985 was about 3 billion pounds
more than the level in 1983. The 38,000 dairy farmers
who participated in the program culled cows to meet
the required short-term cut in production, but in many
cases the culled cows were replaced by heifers with
superior genetic potential as soon as the program ex-
pired. There are at least two lessons to be learned
from the failure of the Milk Diversion Program. First,
the $10 per hundredweight payment was probably too
high compared to the fixed cost of producing milk,
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making the program attractive to savvy milk produc-
ers who knew how to “beat the system.”Second, the
time period for reducing milk marketings was too
short, making it easy to hold back higher-producing
replacements for the cows culled to meet the market-
ing restriction.
Still facing a major milk surplus problem, Congress
authorized the Dairy Termination Program (Whole
Herd Buyout) in the Food Security Act of 1985.
The USDA accepted bids from dairy farmers who
were willing to slaughter or export all female dairy
cattle and remain out of the dairy business for at
least 5 years.
The USDAwas able to sign up dairy producers total-
ing about 12 billion pounds of milk marketings by
accepting all bids made by producers of $22.50 per
cwt or less. Those producers whose bids were ac-
cepted had to dispose of all dairy cattle over an 18
month period during 1986 and 1987 and remain out
of dairying for five years. Direct payments to partici-
pants totaled $1.8 billion over the fiscal 1986
through fiscal 1991 period.
Compared to the Milk Diversion Program, the whole
herd buyout was successful in moderating production
trends. However, the induced slaughter of dairy cows
was credited for negatively affected beef markets,
raising the ire of cattle producers and leading to cries
of, “never again.”
The use of refundable assessments has been the most
recent voluntary supply management option used in
the U.S. dairy industry. The milk assessments that
dairy producers faced during the early 1990s were
put in place to reduce government spending on dairy
programs. These assessments were not debated as a
voluntary supply management proposal. Yet, when
Congress allowed these assessments to be refunded
to producers who did not increase their milk market-
ings, producers had to make a choice each year about
whether to increase their milk production or hold
milk production flat and receive a check reimbursing
their assessment.
The first assessment program that allowed for the re-
fund of producer assessments arose out of the 1982
Omnibus Reconciliation Act. The act collected two
separate 50 cent assessments. The first 50 cent as-
sessment was not refundable while the second 50
cent assessment was refundable to producers who re-
duced their marketings at least 8.4 percent below
their base marketings.
The 1990 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act re-
quired that all milk marketed in the U.S. be assessed
5 cents per hundredweight in 1991 and a minimum
of 11.25 cents per hundredweight over 1992-1995.
Those producers who held milk marketings flat
relative to the previous year were eligible for a re-
fund of the assessments they paid the following year.
The assessment rate was then increased during the
1992-1995 period to result in a net assessment of
11.25 cents per hundredweight to be collected. Re-
funds of dairy assessments in fiscal 1996 reached
$82.039 million, the last full fiscal year of the pro-
gram. Assessments collected in fiscal 1995 totaled
$225 million.
The Current Program: Cooperatives Work-
ing Together (CWT)
The objective of the government-sponsored volun-
tary supply management programs was to enhance
and stabilize farm-level milk prices by controlling
the amount of milk marketed. Recently, an industry-
sponsored voluntary milk supply management pro-
gram was initiated to achieve similar objectives by
using some of the same techniques.
The program, labeled CWT for Cooperatives Work-
ing Together, was designed and is managed by the
National Milk Producers Federation, a trade associa-
tion of dairy cooperatives. Members of participating
dairy cooperatives and, if they choose, independent
dairy farmers fund the program through an assess-
ment of ten cents per hundredweight of milk mar-
keted (the original program had a five cent
assessment that increased to the current ten cent level
in July 2006). Participation in the CWT has ranged
between 67 and 74 percent of all milk marketed in
the U.S. The early CWT press releases suggest the
program collected a little less than $60 million annu-
ally when there was a five cent assessment. Moving
to the ten cent assessment reduced program partici-
pation, but a general increase in milk production sug-
gests that funds have roughly doubled with the
increase in the assessment.
CWT has used two methods of voluntary supply
management: herd retirement and dairy export incen-
tives.1 Under herd retirement, bids are accepted from
dairy farmers who are willing to slaughter their milk-
ing herd. Export incentives provide participating co-
operatives subsidies on exports of butter and cheese.
There is some flexibility in the operation of CWT
program since the CWT committee has the ability to
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adjust the operation of these two programs or add
new programs as it chooses.
CWT programs are only available to those producers
and cooperatives who participate by paying the CWT
assessment. The CWT program is a federation of co-
operatives and producers formed in accordance with
the Capper-Volstead Act and acts in association for
the specific purpose of achieving strong and stable
milk prices.
The CWT Herd Retirement Program
The herd retirement program has been the most
heavily used part of the CWT programs. Roughly 90
percent of the funds have been used for herd retire-
ment. CWT has had nine herd retirement “rounds” to
date. The inaugural herd retirement in late 2003 re-
moved 32,724 cows from 299 dairy farms (see figure
below for a history of CWT herd retirements). In
total, the herd retirement program has removed over
475,000 cows through 2009.
Herds accepted in any CWT herd retirement round
go through an audit process that includes examining
current milk production relative to the previous year
to ensure that the herd has not seen significant
changes in production prior to be accepted. Once that
audit process is successfully completed, the dry and
milking cows are CWT tagged and the producer is
responsible to send these animals to slaughter in the
next 15 days. Once the tags are returned to CWT, the
producer will receive his/her check.
CWT has a general set of guidelines that are used in
determining when to hold a herd retirement. They in-
clude the: 1) all-milk price, 2) cost of milk produc-
tion, 3) milk-feed price ratio, 4) dairy cow numbers,
5) milk production, and 6) dairy cow culling.
Beginning in 2008, the herd retirement program was
expanded to allow producers to bid their bred heifers
in addition to their milk cow herd. To date, just over
4,500 bred heifers have been removed through
slaughter.
The herd retirement program was ramped up signifi-
cantly in late 2008 as the serious decline in milk
prices was becoming reality for the industry. In fact,
over 50 percent of the cows bought in herd retire-
ments occurred in the last four herd retirements that
occurred in a span of about 12 months.
Current discussion of CWT has focused on how to
make the herd retirement program more effective. As
CWT looks to maximize return on participating pro-
ducers’ assessment, new program features continue
to be examined. Ideas like partial herd retirements
have recently surfaced.
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When CWT announces a herd retirement event,
CWT participants can offer a bid to the program to
remove their current milking herd. CWT then selects
bids based primarily on the level of bids. In the orig-
inal herd retirement rules, regional safeguards were
included to ensure a balanced approach to removing
cows. This tended to cause average bids across re-
gions to vary when the safeguard level was triggered
Regional safeguards have been lifted in recent herd
retirements. In general, the level of average bids has
varied with economic conditions. In tough economic
times, average bids tended to be lower than in strong
financial times. Note from the figure below that
2005 had the highest average bid of $6.75 per cwt.
In the most recent rounds, CWT imposed a cap on
bids of $5.25 per cwt.
The CWT Export Assistance Program
The export assistance program was included in the
CWT original program detail announcement on July
11, 2003. In November 2003, an export assistance
announcement was made where CWT made $20
million available for export assistance and an-
nounced that the program was expected to move 30
million pounds of cheese and 10 million pounds of
butter overseas. To avoid conflict with significant
volumes of nonfat dry milk that could be moved
under the Dairy Export Incentive Program (DEIP),
CWT has not offered export assistance to nonfat
dry milk.The November 2003 export assistance
announcement suggested that the export assistance
program would kick in when cheese prices were l
ess than $1.30 per pound and when butter prices fell
below $1.10 per pound.
The total volume of dairy products exported with
CWT export assistance remained below 10 million
pounds annually until 2006 when slightly more
than 40 million pounds moved under the program.
In 2004, CWT raised the triggers for export assis-
tance to $1.40 per pound for cheese and $1.30 per
pound for butter. By 2008, CWT had removed
specific triggers for the operation of the export
assistance program.
Note from the figure below that 2008 has been the
largest year for use of CWT export assistance with
80 million pounds of products exported with assis-
tance. In 2008, the difference between world prices
and domestic prices reduced the level of per unit
assistance required, making the program less expen-
sive to operate. With the collapse of world prices
in 2009, export assistance was not used. In March
2010, CWT announced the use of export assistance
for cheddar cheese.
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Issues Regarding the Operation of the
CWT Program
As with any program that has operated in agricultural
markets, there have been critics of the CWT program
and the associated benefits and costs to the U.S.
dairy industry. There are several features involved in
operating the CWT program that can influence the
effects the program can have on the marketplace.
Some of the criticism can be tackled head on while
other criticism remains impossible to answer with
certainty given CWT effects happen simultaneously
with everything else happening in the industry.
The herd retirement program has had critics that feel
significant producer cheating has occurred. Moving
of milking cows in the night or construction of a
CWT herd retirement operation are examples of
these criticisms. However, the stories of these kinds
of activities often greatly exaggerate what has hap-
pened in reality. CWT has a formal audit process that
takes place for each operation that bids into a herd
retirement to ensure compliance with the program.
Additional guidelines have been incorporated
through time that has minimized the ability to take
advantage of the system. Cheating in any program
can never be eliminated but the guidelines used by
CWT make this a rare problem.
Perhaps a more important issue to the CWT herd re-
tirement program is whether the program has bought
cows that were going to leave regardless of the
whether they were taken out in a herd retirement
event or not. This is often described as “buying air”
since the production was going to leave anyway. It is
impossible to know which or how many dairy farm-
ers who bid into a herd retirement would have done
so in the absence of the program. It is clear that CWT
bought and removed cows that were contributing to
current milk supplies. By buying these cows, they
were removed from production instead of being sold
to another dairy farmer who continued to milk them.
So regardless of producer intent, CWT herd retire-
ment removed milk supplies more quickly than
would have occurred otherwise.
The CWT program does not require producers to stay
out of production when they participate in a herd re-
tirement round; only that they sell all of their milking
cows. If producers have interest in multiple opera-
tions, they must offer cows from all of the operations
if they wish to participate. Rule changes in 2009 re-
quire producers to stay out of production for twelve
months to receive their full payment. Specifically,
producers are paid 90 percent of their bid when ac-
cepted but the last 10 percent plus interest is paid
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twelve months later when it is verified that the pro-
ducer and the producer’s operation still remains out
of milking. But this CWT feature is less restrictive
than many of the government voluntary supply man-
agement programs used in the past. Consequently,
bids under CWT have fallen well below the average
$15 bid accepted under the whole herd buyout pro-
gram of the 1980s, which has been the only other
program that directly targeted cow removal. This as-
pect of the program has led to discussion about how
quickly CWT herd retirement producers are returning
to production. CWT surveyed producers who partici-
pated in the 2007 herd retirement program and found
that 88 percent of those who returned a survey did
not plan to return to production. Many of the respon-
dents cited economic conditions as the reason for ex-
iting with only eight percent wanting to start a new
herd and one percent of respondents indicating that
they wanted to relocate the dairy.
Perhaps more important to the magnitude of the ef-
fects of a herd retirement program is how producers
not participating respond. If these producers are in-
terested in expanding their operation, they may time
their expansion to coincide with a herd retirement
round, anticipating higher milk prices from the herd
retirement. Current economic conditions facing the
industry and the availability of dairy heifers are im-
portant determinants of the magnitude of this effect.
Other things held constant, the less anticipated a
CWT herd retirement round, the less likely non-par-
ticipants are to ramp up cow numbers and thereby
offset the CWT program effect.
Many participating dairy producers have voiced con-
cern regarding those producers who are not con-
tributing to the CWT program but still benefit from it
through the participation of others. The CWT pro-
gram saw participation reach 74 percent around 2006
but then decline to below 70 percent today. Declining
participation reduces total funding for CWT and di-
minishes its impact. How to increase participation
and funding appears to be the largest issue the CWT
program will need to address in the near term.
CWT herd retirements have little long-term effect on
milk supplies. The general economic conditions fac-
ing the dairy industry will determine milk supplies.
However, CWT can significantly influence short-run
milk supplies in periods of low economic returns. If
CWT herd retirements end, the industry will return to
the same level of milk supplies in three to five years
that would have occurred in absence of the program.
As a result, herd retirements can have significant ef-
fects on the path towards long-run milk prices.
Analysis conducted by Brown for the CWT program
shows that the effects of an individual herd retire-
ment are completely gone after about three years. Yet
the combination of all herd retirement events has
provided an increase in 2009 U.S. all milk prices of
over $1.50 per cwt.
CWT export assistance moves certain dairy products
out of domestic markets and into world markets.
That reduces available supplies of these dairy prod-
ucts and raises their prices. How much depends on
the elasticity of domestic demand for these products.
The more inelastic the demand the larger the price
increase.
The market psychology of the export assistance pro-
gram may have also benefited dairy prices. The mar-
ket price for cheese stayed slightly above CWT
trigger levels during some periods of the programs
operation. Further longer term help to producer re-
turns can occur if export assistance helps companies
develop new longer term markets for U.S. dairy
products. The USDEC involvement in export assis-
tance may prove helpful in developing new markets
for U.S. dairy products over the long term. Brown’s
analysis suggests that the 80 million pounds of dairy
products that received export assistance in 2008 in-
creased U.S. all milk prices by about $0.10 per cwt
in that year.
Endnotes
1 Initially, CWT also included a milk production reduction in-
centive program that, like the Milk Diversion Program, paid
producers for cutting production below a base level. This pro-
gram was used only once since there was limited interest with
only 514 bids submitted and 77 bids accepted for the program
in 2003.
The dairy industry works within a market economy
governed by the laws of supply and demand. This
means that market forces interact within the confines
of dairy market regulations to influence the level of
farm milk prices, milk production and milk and dairy
product consumption. When milk production in-
creases faster than consumption, the laws of supply
and demand imply that the market price of milk will
fall. As prices fall, some dairy farmers may leave
the dairy industry. Simultaneously, consumption
increases as wholesale and retail prices of milk
and dairy products slowly decrease. These forces
continue until a milk price is determined that bal-
ances milk production and consumption, plus any
quantity purchased by the existing federal dairy price
support program.
Since the mid-1990’s, support prices established
under the federal price support program have been at
a level that provides a very limited safety net to farm
milk prices. The result has been increased volatility
of farm milk prices. When farm milk prices are rela-
tively high expansions and new entrants increase the
size of the nation’s dairy herd and total milk produc-
tion, putting downward pressure on farm milk prices.
Falling farm milk prices lead to unfavorable pro-
ducer returns, causing some producers to exit dairy-
ing and reducing cow numbers and milk production.
Dairy producers struggle with managing the risk as-
sociated with these volatile milk prices. When milk
prices are low dairy producers are under financial
stress and experience loss of equity in their opera-
tion. When milk prices improve it takes a period of
time to recover and build back lost equity. These ups
and downs have turned attention to some type of sup-
ply management program that will reduce price
volatility and prevent the very low milk prices that
cause costly disinvestment.
Public policy issues
Supply management can be defined as a national
program that regulates the level of milk production
to match the demand for milk and dairy products at
an acceptable farm milk price level. Supply pro-
grams may be either voluntary or mandatory. Volun-
tary supply management, like the Milk Diversion and
Whole-Herd Buyout programs of the mid-1980’s,
typically offer a carrot to encourage participation.
Mandatory supply management uses a stick—
penalties for failing to adhere to production limits.
Mandatory supply management programs for dairy
in the U.S. have long been discussed and debated,
but have never come close to being adopted. But
with increased milk price volatility and a sustained
period of very low prices, interest in adopting some
type of mandatory supply management program
has increased.
On the surface, a mandatory supply management
program may look rather simple. Some central au-
thority calculates the anticipated level of consump-
tion at a specified milk price and then makes sure
the amount of milk marketed matches consumption
at this price. However, implementing such a program
within a dairy industry comprised of about 70,000
commercial dairy farmers would be a formidable
endeavor. In particular, with differences in milk
production costs among regions of the U.S. and
among individual farmers within a region, deciding
on an appropriate farm milk price target would be
contentious. And determining the amount of milk
production that matches domestic consumption
and export sales at the target price would be an
enormous challenge.
Because the goal of mandatory supply management
is to restrict milk production to maintain farm milk
prices above where they would otherwise be, the
right to deliver milk to the market becomes a valu-
able possession. Some method must be developed to
allocate these rights to current or would-be dairy pro-
ducers. As domestic consumption and/or dairy ex-
ports grow, questions emerge regarding how this
growth should be allocated between current produc-
ers and new entrants to the industry. Should these
market rights, defined as a base or quota milk vol-
ume, be held by individual dairy producers or owned
by the government and allocated through a govern-
ment agency? Should the marketing right be freely
transferable from one dairy producer to another or
should the right be tied to the dairy farm? Should the
marketing right be on volume of milk or volume of
milk components marketed?
Mandatory supply management programs can have
structural consequences. The implementation of
mandatory supply management by allocating
bases/quotas to existing dairy producers has the ef-
Mandatory Milk Supply Management
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fect of stabilizing the current human and physical
capital base, technology practices, and location of
milk production. The tendency of mandatory supply
management programs is to freeze the structure of
dairy farms and regional milk production. How
bases/quota is transferred determines how quickly
this structure may change. If bases/quotas are freely
transferable and not tied to a specific dairy facility,
structural changes would be quicker than those tied
to a facility or region of the U.S.
History of milk supply management
Mandatory milk supply management programs have
been widely discussed and several related bills have
been introduced in Congress. None of these bills has
passed. Voluntary supply management programs
have been implemented, but only temporarily. The
Milk Diversion Program operated from January 1,
1984 through May 31, 1985. Under this program
dairy producers who voluntarily reduced their milk
marketings from the previous years by 10 to 30 per-
cent were paid $10 per hundredweight for the re-
duced marketings. Then fromApril 1, 1986 through
August 31, 1987 the Dairy Termination program was
in effect. Dairy farmers submitted bids for agreeing
to slaughter or export their entire herd of milk cows
and replacement heifers and to remain out of dairy-
ing for the next five years.
The depressed milk prices experienced in 2009 again
motivated industry support for some type of milk
supply management program. Proposals for both vol-
untary and mandatory programs are being discussed,
with some proposals drafted into bill form and intro-
duced to Congress. Whether there will be sufficient
Congressional support and support by dairy farmers
to put a supply management program in place is un-
certain. In the past, dairy farmer interest in supply
management has dwindled if milk prices improve
during Congressional debate on supply management
proposals.
Concerns and issues with mandatory
supply management
Maintaining a milk price and/or reducing price
volatility different from what normal market forces
would dictate requires careful management of milk
supply. A number of decisions need to be made by a
central authority, most likely the US Department of
Agriculture with the possibility of input from an in-
dustry advisory committee. Concerns and issues that
need to be considered include the following:
• Facilitating change: Dairy markets need to be al-
lowed to evolve and change. Successful supply man-
agement programs need to contain a mechanism to
allow for milk production capacity to adjust as do-
mestic consumption and dairy exports change.
USDAmust forecast the amount of milk production
needed for domestic consumption and exports at
least annually and adjust quotas accordingly. In addi-
tion, the target milk price under the program needs to
be adjusted from time to time to reflect changes in
milk production costs.
• Transferability: The need to transfer bases and
quotas arises when supply controls are in place for
more than a year or two as some producers exit the
industry, some want to expand milk production and
others want to enter the industry. The options for
transfer include letting existing dairy producers sell
and transfer their base and quota to the highest bid-
der, perhaps through an organized auction market,
having the bases and quota owned and controlled by
the government, or a combination of these two op-
tions. Allowing dairy producers to be free to sell and
transfer bases and quotas could lead to a concentra-
tion of allowable milk production among a small
number of relatively large dairy operations and
making it extremely difficult for new producers
to enter dairying. Politics is likely to enter into a
system where the government controls all transfers.
A combination of these options could allow produc-
ers to transfer a portion of their base and quota with
the government controlling and transferring the
remaining portion to other dairy producers and to
new producers.
Quotas used by some countries also restrict geo-
graphic transfers. For example, the EU prohibits the
transfer of quotas between countries. Similarly,
Canada restricts transfer between provinces. Such re-
strictions prevent milk production to move to areas
of growing demand or lower milk production cost
• Capitalization of quota values: Because supply
management programs are designed to elevate milk
prices or keep them from falling, the first dairy pro-
ducers to receive quota “rights to produce” stand to
receive a significant windfall gain. If quotas are al-
lowed to be transferred, their value will eventually
rise to the value of benefits accruing over time. This
is true whether quotas are tied to farms, cows or just
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pieces of paper. This capitalization makes it difficult
for new producers to purchase enough quota to enter
dairying and increases the cost of dairy expansion by
existing producers. Only a government-owned and
controlled quota transfer system could eliminate or
reduce this capitalization issue. It is doubtful that this
much government control would be acceptable to
dairy producers.
• The penalty for over quota production: To en-
sure the mandatory supply management holds milk
production to the level necessary to achieve a higher
milk price, there needs to be a penalty for producing
and marketing milk in excess of quota. This most
likely would involve a two-tier pricing system that
has a relatively high price for quota milk and a low
milk price for over quota milk that is below the vari-
able cost of production. But with significant differ-
ences in milk production costs among individual
dairy producers and regions of the U.S., getting a
consensus on what is an acceptable price for quota
milk and the penalty for over quota milk may be dif-
ficult.
• Demand impacts: If supply management increases
average farm milk prices, then, average prices for
milk and dairy products to consumers will also be
higher. While the demand for milk and dairy prod-
ucts is inelastic, consumers do respond to prices and
higher prices mean lower consumption of milk and
dairy products. The decision on the level of farm
milk price to maintain must take into consideration
the impact on consumption.
• Imports and exports: The decision on the level of
farm milk prices to maintain under supply manage-
ment also needs to take into account the impact on
dairy imports and dairy exports. A farm price that is
too high may attract additional imports or require
tightened import restrictions. U.S. dairy products
could become less competitive in international mar-
kets, reducing export potential.
Endnotes
1Wholesale and retail prices don’t necessarily change by the
relative same amount as the farm milk price changes.
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This paper is lengthier than the other papers in
this series because the issues are more compli-
cated. Federal milk marketing orders have
evolved over 75 years. Over that time, there have
been numerous changes in pricing rules and other
regulations to conform to changes in the dairy
industry. Changes in federal orders have fre-
quently been controversial, often because of their
disparate regional effects.
We begin this paper with a general discussion of
how federal orders work. We then move to some
aspects of orders that have generated recent con-
troversy: methods of setting minimum prices for
milk used for manufacturing and for moving other
milk prices; level and regional pattern of Class I
milk prices; number of classes and dairy products
within classes; and regulations related to pooling.
We stress at the outset that our description of
federal milk marketing order pricing is simplified
and abbreviated. Readers looking for more detail
should refer to:
Jesse, Ed, and Bob Cropp, Basic Milk Pricing
Concepts for Dairy Farmers, Bul. No. A3379,
Cooperative Extension, University of Wisconsin-
Extension, Sept. 2008.
Milk Pricing Under Federal Milk Market-
ing Orders
Federal milk marketing orders regulate the pricing of
about 65 percent of the Grade Amilk produced in the
United States.1 Most of the remaining Grade Amilk
is regulated by state marketing orders, the largest of
which is California’s state order that prices about 21
percent of U.S milk. Federal orders require milk
plants, called handlers, to pay no less than specified
minimum prices for milk and milk components ac-
cording to how their milk receipts are used; that is,
what products they make. This is called classified
pricing. Producers—who are not regulated under or-
ders—are guaranteed minimum prices that represent
weighted average values of the handler prices. This is
called market-wide pooling.
Classified pricing
Federal orders define four classes of milk, from high-
est to lowest value in most cases:
1. Class I milk is used for beverage products. These
products include whole, low-fat and skim milk,
chocolate and other flavored milk, liquid buttermilk
and eggnog.
2. Class II milk is used for soft manufactured prod-
ucts like ice cream and other frozen desserts, cottage
cheese and cream products.
3. Class III milk is used for manufacture hard cheeses
and cream cheese.
4. Class IV milk is used to make butter and dry milk
products, principally nonfat dry milk.
USDA announces monthly minimum handler pay
prices for each of the four classes of milk. according
to a predefined schedule. Monthly prices for Classes
III, Class IV, and the butterfat portion of Class II are
announced on the Friday on or before the 5th of the
month following the month to which they apply. For
example, March 2010 prices were announced on Fri-
day, April 2.
Based on the argument that Class I milk products and
most Class II milk products move through the market-
ing system within a few days of processing, the mini-
mum Class I price and the minimum skim milk price
for Class II are announced earlier than the Class III
and IV prices. They are announced by USDA on the
Friday on or before the 23rd of the month before the
month to which they apply. This “early warning” is
designed to allow processors to alter price sheets to
retailers and other distributors before the new prices
become effective. For example, the March 2010
prices were announced on Friday, February 19.
The following table details the Class price announce-
ment dates for the month of March 2010.
The Class prices are based on product price formulas
that relate milk component values to: (1) the whole-
sale prices of dairy products manufactured from the
milk components, (2) the yield of the finished product
in terms of the milk components used to make them,
and (3) assumed manufacturing costs, or make al-
lowances. The volume of components per 100 pounds
Federal Milk Marketing Orders
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of milk at standard composition is then multiplied
by the component values to derive the Class III and
Class IV prices per hundredweight. The formula-
based procedure for setting minimum class prices
was implemented January 2000.
Formulas tie all federal order milk prices directly
and mechanically to wholesale prices for four dairy
products: Grade AA butter, cheddar cheese, nonfat
dry milk and dry whey. The wholesale prices used
in the formulas are collected from sellers of these
products and reported weekly by the National Agri-
cultural Statistics Service (NASS). Reported prices
are for products that have been priced and shipped.
Prices based on long term contracts—that is, sales
for which the selling price was set (and not adjusted)
30 or more days before the transaction was com-
pleted—are not included.
Details of the current pricing formulas for the four
milk classes follow.
Class IV price
The Class IV price is linked to the values of nonfat
milk solids and butterfat. Nonfat solids make up non-
fat dry milk, and butterfat is the principal constituent
of butter. Thus, the Class IV price is determined
through formulas tying butterfat and nonfat solids
prices to butter and nonfat dry milk prices.
Class IV Butterfat Price/lb =
(NASS monthly AA butter price/lb - 0.1202) X 1.20
The value, 0.1202, is the butter “make allowance,”
USDA’s estimate of the cost of manufacturing a
pound of butter. The value, 1.20, is the assumed
pounds of butter made from one pound of butterfat.
Class IV Nonfat Solids Price/lb =
(NASS monthly nonfat dry milk price/lb - 0.1570) X 0.99
The nonfat dry milk make allowance is $0.1570 and
the assumed yield of nonfat dry milk per pound of
nonfat milk solids is 0.99.
Class IV Skim Milk Price/cwt =
9.0 X Nonfat Solids Price/lb
The assumption here is that 100 pounds of skim milk
contains 9.0 pounds of nonfat milk solids.
Class IV Price/cwt =
3.5 X Butterfat Price/lb + 0.965 X Class IV Skim Milk
Price/cwt
The Class IV price per hundredweight is the com-
bined value of 3.5 pounds of butterfat and 96.5
pounds of skim milk.
Class III Price
The Class III price is the value per hundredweight
of milk represented by the value of butterfat in butter
and in cheese, the value of protein in cheese and the
value of other (nonfat, non-protein) solids in whey.2
Accordingly, three related product price formulas
link the butterfat price to butter prices, the protein
price to cheese and butterfat prices, and the other
solids price to dry whey prices. The Class III Butter-
fat Price/lb is the same as that derived in the Class IV
price formula.
USDAAnnounced Class Prices for March 2010
February 2010
Sun. Mon Tues. Wed. Thurs. Fri. Sat.
1 2 3 4 5 6
7 8 9 10 11 12 13
14 15 16 17 18 19* 20
21 22 23 24 25 26 27
28
*Class I price and Class II skim milk price an-
nounced
April 2010
Sun. Mon. Tues. Wed. Thurs. Fri. Sat.
1 2* 3
4 5 6 7 8 9 10
11 12 13 14 15 16 17
18 19 20 21 22 23 24
25 26 27 28 29 30
*Class III and IV prices and Class II butterfat
price announced
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Class III Other Solids Price/lb =
(NASS monthly dry whey price/lb – 0.1956) X 1.03
The dry whey make allowance is about 4 cents per
pound higher than the make allowance for nonfat dry
milk in the Class IV formula. The assumed yield of
dry whey per pound of other solids is 0.4 pounds
more than the yield of nonfat dry milk per pound of
nonfat milk solids.
Class III Protein Price/lb =
(NASS monthly cheese price/lb – 0.1682) X 1.383 +
{[(NASS monthly cheese price/lb – 0.1682) X 1.572
] – 0.9X butterfat price/lb} X 1.17
The first part of this complex equation is the net value
of protein in cheese–making (cheese price less make
allowance times pounds of cheese per pound of pro-
tein. The NASS cheese price is a weighted average
price for 40-pound blocks and 500-pound barrels of
cheddar cheese with weights based on relative sales.
The 500-pound barrel price is adjusted to represent 38
percent moisture content and 3 cents is added to re-
flect a lower assumed make cost for barrel versus
block cheddar cheese.
The second part of the protein price equation attempts
to account for the value of butterfat in cheese in ex-
cess of the value of butterfat in butter. It recognizes
that protein has value in cheese over and above its di-
rect contribution to the cheese itself. That added value
is attributable to the fact that the casein in protein al-
lows retention of butterfat in cheese. In other words,
cheese cannot be made from protein by itself. The
1.572 factor in the second part of the equation is the
assumed pounds of cheese made from one pound of
butterfat, holding everything else constant.
Class III Skim Milk Price/cwt =
3.1 X protein price + 5.9 X other solids price
The composition of skim milk is assumed to be 3.1
percent true protein and 5.9 percent other nonfat/non-
protein solids.
Class III Price/cwt =
3.5 X Butterfat price/lb + 0.965 X Class III skim milk
price/cwt
The Class III price formula accounts for all of the
value of a hundredweight of milk testing 3.5 percent
butterfat, 2.99 percent true protein (3.1 X 0.965) and
5.69 percent other solids (5.9 X 0.965) that is used to
make cheese and whey.
Class II Price
Class I and Class II skim milk component values are
advanced-priced. The pricing formulas are exactly the
same as used for Class III and Class IV component
values, but the wholesale prices used in the formulas
are from a different and shorter time period. Ad-
vanced wholesale product prices are for the first two
weeks of the month previous to the month to which
the Class I and Class II skim milk price apply.
The Class II skim milk price per hundredweight is de-
rived as follows:
Class II Skim Milk Price/cwt =
Advanced Class IV skim milk price/cwt + $0.70
The advanced Class IV skim milk price calculation is
identical to that shown for the Class IV skim milk
price except that the NASS advanced nonfat dry milk
prices are used rather than the monthly prices.
Class II Butterfat Price/lb =
Class III/IV butterfat price + $0.007
Class II butterfat is NOT advanced-priced. It is the
monthly Class III/IV butterfat price per pound plus
1/100 times the per hundredweight differential added
to the Class II skim milk price. This equalizes the
added value (over Class IV) of Class II skim milk and
butterfat.
Class II Price/cwt =
3.5 X Class II butterfat price/lb + 0.965 X Class II
advanced skim milk price/cwt
That is, the Class II price consists of the combined
value of 3.5 pounds of butterfat and 96.5 pounds of
skim milk.
Class I Price
Both the skim milk and butterfat portions of the Class
I price are advanced priced and related pricing formu-
las use NASS advanced (2-week) wholesale product
prices instead of the monthly NASS prices used in
Class III and Class IV formulas.
Class I Skim Milk Price/cwt =
Higher of Advanced Class III or advanced Class IV skim
milk price/cwt + Class I differential
Class I Butterfat Price/lb =
Advanced Class III/IV Butterfat Price/lb + Class I
differential/100
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The “mover” of Class I skim milk prices is the higher
of the advanced Class IV or Class III skim milk price.
Class I differentials are specified for each county
within a federal milk marketing order marketing area.
In general, differentials within orders decrease with
distance from the major consumption location within
the order marketing area. Differentials range from a
low of $1.60 per hundredweight for some North
Dakota counties to a high of $6.00 for some Florida
counties.
Pooling
Pooling is accomplished under federal orders by obli-
gating each regulated handler to account for milk re-
ceipts according to how the milk was utilized within
each of the four classes. Handlers pay into or draw
from a producer settlement fund depending on the
value of their milk receipts priced at order minimum
prices relative to the market-wide average value
(often called uniform price or blend price). Basically,
a Class I bottler would pay into the pool the differ-
ence between the higher-valued Class I milk and the
market-wide average value. A Class III handler (e.g.,
a cheese plant—called a supply plant under the order)
would draw out of the pool the difference between the
market-wide average price and the lower Class III
price. Each handler (the exception being dairy coop-
eratives) is obligated to pay producers no less than the
federal order market-wide uniform price.
A handler’s obligation under the pooling concept is as
follows:
Class I obligation =
Class I skim milk price at location3 X skim milk pounds
+ Class I butterfat price at location X butterfat pounds
Class II obligation =
Class II nonfat solids price X nonfat solids pounds
+ Class II butterfat price X butterfat pounds
Class III obligation =
Protein price X protein pounds
+ Other solids price X other solids pounds
+ Class III/IV Butterfat price X butterfat pounds
Class IV obligation =
Nonfat solids price X nonfat solids pounds
+ Class III/IV Butterfat price X butterfat pounds
The following items are deducted from the gross
value of each handler’s milk based on the obligation’s
noted above to derive the “net” handler obligation to
the pool:
• Producer price differential (for orders using multiple
component pricing)
• Butterfat, Protein and Other Solids value at mini-
mum component prices
• Producer location adjustment
• Somatic cell count adjustment value (in some
orders)
If the results of subtracting these deductions from
gross milk value is positive (which is normally the
case for a Class I handler), the handler pays the differ-
ence into the producer settlement fund. If the result is
negative (as it normally would be for a Class III han-
dler), the handler draws the difference from the fund.
The producer price differential (often abbreviated,
PPD) applies to the federal orders that pay producers
on the basis of milk components marketed—pounds
of butterfat, protein and other solids.4 For these orders
the handler is obligated to pay producers the Class III
values per pound of butterfat, protein and other solids
marketed by the producer. The PPD is a measure of
how much the average market-wide value of handler
receipts exceeds the average value if all milk were
priced at Class III.
The PPD can be approximated by adding the differ-
ences between the Class III price and the Class I,
Class II and Class IV prices multiplied by the respec-
tive percent utilization of milk in the entire pool as
Class I, II and IV. For example, in January 2010 the
Class III price was $14.50. An estimate of the PPD in
January 2010 for the Upper Midwest order would be
calculated as follow
($16.83 Class I - $14.50) X 13.0% Class I = $0.3029
($15.22 Class II - $14.50) X 2.6% Class II = $0.0187
($13.85 Class IV - $14.50) X 2.0% Class IV = ($0.0130)
January PPD = $0.3086
The actual PPD will differ from this sum due to other
adjustments in the order pool including transportation
credits, assembly credits and producer milk somatic
cell count adjustment.
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The producer location adjustment accounts for differ-
ences in the Class I differential at the receiving plant
(plant where milk is processed) and the differential at
the location of the supply plant (plant that supplies
raw milk) for interplant milk shipments.
The somatic cell value relates to price adjustments for
quality at the producer level for milk used in Class II,
III and IV. Quality is measured by somatic cell count
of producer milk relative to a base level of 350,000
cells per ml. Since somatic cell count affects cheese
yield, a rate per 1,000 cell count above or below the
base is derived by multiplying the cheese price used
in the protein price formula by 0.0005.5
Handlers’ producer settlement fund payments may be
adjusted by transportation credits and assembly cred-
its. Transportation credits apply to actual shipments
of milk for Class I use from supply plants to distribut-
ing plants to partially defray the cost of moving the
milk to the Class I market. Distributing plants are pri-
marily engaged in processing packaged fluid milk
products. Supply plants are primarily engaged in
manufacturing dairy products, shipping milk to dis-
tributing plants on an “as needed” basis and to meet
minimum shipping requirements under the applicable
order. Assembly credits are paid to pool plants (dis-
tributing plants, supply plants, and cooperatives) on
producer milk that is used for Class I purposes. As-
sembly credits provide an additional incentive to
“give up” milk for Class I use that may otherwise be
destined for manufacturing. Transportation and as-
sembly credits are only paid to handlers on actual
movements of milk to Class I use and are subtracted
from the total pool proceeds in the process of calcu-
lating the PPD. In other words, the total Class I value
is reduced by the amount of these credits.
The producer settlement fund accounting is illustrated
in the table below for two handlers using actual
Upper Midwest Order January 2010 component
prices, Class I differential and PPD. Both handlers
have January milk receipts of 200,000,000 pounds of
milk with a milk composition of 3.7 percent butterfat,
3.08 percent protein and 5.7 percent other solids.
Class of milk, Rate Handler 1 Handler 2
deductions and per
milk components pound Pounds Value Pounds Value
Class I: Skim milk $0.1162 128,050,000 $14,879,410 3,940,000 $457,828
Butterfat $1.5874 1,950,000 $3,095,430 600,000 $952,440
Class II: Nonfat solids $1.1689 2,724,000 $3,184,084 908,000 $1,061,361
Butterfat $1.4475 3,990,000 $5,775,525 1,330,000 $1,925,175
Class III: Protein $2.7916 616,000 $1,719,626 4,312,000 $12,037,379
Other solids $0.1946 1,140,000 $221,844 7,980,000 $1,552,908
Butterfat $1.4405 740,000 $1,065,970 5,180,000 $7,461,790
Class IV: Nonfat solids $1.0148 1,880,000 $1,907,824 940,000 $953,912
Butterfat $1.4405 720,000 $1,037,160 290,000 $417,745
Total value for Handler $32,886,873 $26,820,538
Less: deductions from the pool
•PPD $0.0026 200,000,000 $520,000 200,000,000 $520,000
•Protein value $2.7916 6,160,000 $17,196,256 6,160,00 $17,196,256
•Other solids value $0.1946 11,400,000 $2,218,440 11,400,000 $2,218,440
•Butterfat value $1.4405 7,400,000 $10,659,700 7,400,000 $10,659,700
Total deductions $30,594,396 $30,594,396
Net to/from the pool $2,292,477 ($3,773,858)
Illustration of Producer Settlement Fund Obligations
DAIRY POLICY ISSUES 29
Handler 1 has milk utilization of 65 percent Class I,
15 percent Class II, 10 percent Class III and 10 per-
cent Class IV. Handler 2 has milk utilization of 20
percent Class I, 5 percent Class II, 70 percent Class
III and 5 percent Class IV. Both Handlers receive
milk that has an average somatic cell count of
350,000, so the somatic cell adjustment is zero.
Handler 1, primarily a bottling plant, has a positive
net pool obligation of $2,292,477 and pays that
amount into the producer settlement fund. Handler 2,
primarily a cheese plant, has a negative pool obliga-
tion of ($3,773,858) and draws that amount from the
producer settlement fund.6
The Class I price and the Class II skim milk price are
announced about 10 days before the first of the month
to which they apply whereas Class III and Class IV
prices are announced a few days after the first of the
month to which they apply. Because of this roughly
six week time difference, the Class III price occasion-
ally ends up higher than the Class I price when there
is a large and rapid increase in either the Class III or
Class IV price. This “price inversion” results in a neg-
ative PPD and reverses the normal pool obligations of
distributing plants and supply plants—Class III han-
dlers pay into the fund and Class I handlers draw
from the fund. To avoid making producer settlement
fund payments, many supply plants “depooled” (be-
came unregulated plants) in months when the PPD
was negative, causing considerable market disruption.
Recent USDA decisions have tightened rules for
pooling and de-pooling.
Producer prices
With federal order pooling, producers receive a com-
mon price for their milk regardless of how their milk
is used. Minimum pay prices to producers will differ
among plants within an order only according to milk
composition, milk quality (in orders with a somatic
cell count adjustment), and the location of the receiv-
ing plant.
In the six orders using multiple component pricing,
handlers must pay producers at least the following
gross amount:
Individual Producer Total Gross Milk Payment, Multiple
Component Pricing Orders =
Pounds of butterfat marketed X the butterfat price per
pound
+ Pounds of protein marketed X the protein price per
pound
+ Pounds of other solids marketed X the other solids price
per pound
+ Producer price differential X hundredweights of milk
marketed
+/- Somatic cell adjustment per hundredweight of milk
marketed (if applicable)
In the four federal orders that use fat/skim milk pric-
ing, handlers must pay producers at least the follow-
ing gross amount:
Individual Producer Total Gross Milk Payment, Fat/Skim
Orders =
Hundredweights of skim milk marketed X uniform skim
milk price
+ Pounds of butterfat marketed X uniform butterfat price
+/- Hundredweights of milk marketed X plant location
adjustment
The uniform skim milk price is the weighted average
skim milk price from each of the four classes of milk
as calculated from the formulas detailed earlier. The
uniform butterfat price is the weighted average butter-
fat price from the four classes of milk as calculated
from the formulas. The plant location adjustment may
be positive or negative depending upon the location
of the milk plant.
Summary
Ten federal milk marketing orders regulate the pricing
of about 65 percent of the Grade Amilk marketed by
producers in the United States. Six of these orders
pay producers on the basis of milk components mar-
keted—butterfat, protein and other solids—and four
pay producers using fat/skim milk pricing. In both
forms of payment, milk component, skim milk, and
standardized whole milk values are determined from
formulas that link these values directly to wholesale
prices for four dairy products: Grade AA butter, ched-
dar cheese, nonfat dry milk and dry whey. Wholesale
prices used in the formulas are collected from sellers
and reported weekly by the National Agricultural
Statistics Service (NASS). Based on these pricing
formulas, USDA announces monthly minimum han-
dler pay prices for four use classes of milk. Handlers
are obligated to a federal order pool for the value of
the milk they received based on use class and class
prices. In turn, regulated handlers (except dairy
cooperatives) are required to pay producers no less
than the announced federal order prices for milk and
milk components.
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Setting and Moving Class Prices
Historical review
During the 1940’s and 1950’s, individual federal milk
marketing orders used several different methods to
establish minimum class prices. Most orders then had
three classes: Class III (which included all milk used
to make nonperishable manufactured dairy products),
Class II (perishable or fresh products) and Class I
(beverage milk). Besides serving as the minimum
price for milk used for manufacturing, the Class III
price often served as the base price for Class II and
Class I prices.
Economic formulas were used in most orders to deter-
mine the base price. These formulas included factors
that reflected general economic conditions such as in-
flation, wholesale prices, and wage rates; supply con-
ditions such as feed costs, prices received for all farm
products, farm wage rates, and stock levels of dairy
products; and demand conditions such as Class I
sales, inflation rate, and consumer income. These fac-
tors were weighted to determine an index for making
monthly adjustments in the base price. Other orders
used selling prices of dairy products such as butter
and cheese in product formulas to calculate the base
price. Because different methods were used to set
minimum prices for milk used to make manufactured
dairy products, prices varied considerably among fed-
eral orders.
By the early 1960’s, this uncoordinated pricing sys-
tem began to exhibit problems. Improved transporta-
tion systems meant that nonfat dry milk, butter and
cheese could be economically transported across the
country. Using a host of different economic index for-
mulas or product formulas resulted in serious price
alignment problems. Midwest manufacturing plants
complained that “surplus” Grade Amilk not needed
for Class I purposes was being priced lower in the
Northeast, placing them at a competitive disadvantage
in selling their manufactured dairy products in what
was increasingly a national market.
The need for uniformity and consistency in federal
milk order pricing provisions was emphasized
through a series of federal order hearings. USDA con-
cluded that in order to achieve competitive equity,
surplus milk had to be priced uniformly among orders
and these prices had to be aligned with competitive
pay prices being paid for the majority of the unregu-
lated manufacturing grade milk (Grade B) in the
United States. USDA determined that these objectives
could best be achieved by using the reported Min-
nesota-Wisconsin Grade B milk price (M-W price) as
the uniform Class III price. Most of the milk pro-
duced in Minnesota and Wisconsin was Grade B and
these two states accounted for the majority of U.S
production of Grade B milk. Manufacturing plants in
these two states competed aggressively for Grade B
milk supplies. Further, since Minnesota and Wiscon-
sin represented the major reserve supply area for
Grade Amilk for Class I use, national milk supply
and demand conditions were reflected in the M-W
price.
To achieve orderly marketing, USDA deemed it nec-
essary to tie federal order Class II and Class I prices
to the Class III price in a consistent fashion across or-
ders. So not only did the M-W price become the com-
mon price for Grade Amilk used for manufactured
dairy products, it also became the mover of both
Class II and Class I prices. The M-W price was first
used for setting minimum prices paid by regulated
milk plants (handlers) in the Chicago Regional mar-
keting order in 1961 and was gradually adopted by
other federal orders during the remainder of the
1960’s.
The M-W price was computed by the National Agri-
cultural Statistics Service (NASS). It was reported on
or before the 5th of each month and applied to Grade
B milk delivered during the previous month. Deriva-
tion of the M-W price involved a two-stage process
involving two different surveys of manufacturing
milk plants that purchased Grade B milk in Min-
nesota and Wisconsin. In the first stage, base month
prices were estimated from a summary of monthly re-
ports from a sample of manufacturing milk plants lo-
cated in the two states. The plants reported after the
end of the month to which the base month estimate
applied. Hence the base month price was after-the-
fact. It represented an estimate of what plants actually
paid for Grade B milk. The base month price was re-
ported by NASS by the fifth of the month two months
after the month to which it applied. For example, the
base price for a September M-W would be released
on or before October 5, and represent the estimated
plant pay prices for August.
In the second stage of the M-W price derivation
process, NASS surveyed a sub-sample of Minnesota
and Wisconsin Grade B plants. These plants reported
actual pay prices for the first half of the month and
estimated pay prices for the second half of the month
to which the M-W price applied. NASS used this in-
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formation to calculate an estimate of the change in the
Grade B prices from the base month to the current
month. The change in price was added to (subtracted
from) the base month price to create the M-W price.
By the late 1980’s, the M-W price had become an in-
creasingly unreliable indicator of national supply and
demand conditions for milk used for manufacturing
for several reasons. Competition for Grade B milk in
Minnesota and Wisconsin had substantially dimin-
ished with steady declines in Grade B milk produc-
tion and the number of plants buying Grade B milk.
Total milk production in both states had also fallen,
resulting in excess manufacturing plant capacity and
the use of various competitive plant premiums and
farm-to-plant hauling subsidies in an attempt to keep
plants full. Multiple component pricing was becom-
ing more common. And the Upper Midwest region
(primarily Minnesota and Wisconsin) was no longer
the only area having reserve Grade Amilk
supplies.
A federal order hearing was held in 1992 to explore
alternatives to the M-W price. Proposals for other
competitive pay prices and well as product price for-
mulas were offered. USDA recommended that the M-
W price be replaced by the Basic Formula Price
(BFP). The BFP retained the base-month price from
the M-W price, but replaced the change in the base-
month price with a change in value of manufactured
products generated by a product price formula.
Specifically, the base month change was the weighted
percentage change in butter, nonfat dry milk, dry but-
termilk and cheese prices. The prices used in the
product price formula were monthly average prices as
reported by Dairy Market News and the weights were
based on milk use in Minnesota and Wisconsin. The
BFP went into effect on June 1, 1995.
Federal order reform was later mandated by the Fed-
eral Agriculture Improvement and ReformAct of
1996. Among other things the Act required USDA to
conduct a study on replacing the BFP. The study ana-
lyzed several alternatives including another competi-
tive pay price series (NASS at this time was
collecting and reporting A/B competitive pay prices),
economic formulas and product price formulas.
USDA ultimately recommended using product price
formulas that included make allowances and product
yield factors to calculate the minimum monthly prices
for Class III and Class IV. These formulas replaced
the BFP in January 2000. While the make allowances
and yield factors have changed over time, product
price formulas as described earlier continue to be
used today.
Shortly after their adoption, USDA called a hearing to
consider adjustments to the Class III and Class IV
product price formulas to conform to a Congressional
mandate. Resulting amendments were minor except
for a proposed separation of Class III and Class IV
butterfat prices, which was enjoined by a federal
court before implemented. In Late 2001, USDA is-
sued a recommended decision to address the injunc-
tion. The department scrapped the separate butterfat
classes and made some smaller changes in the formu-
las that became effective two years later.
USDA held another hearing in 2007 to address con-
cerns of manufacturing milk plants that make al-
lowances were not reflecting increased energy-related
costs. Based on this hearing, higher make allowances
were implemented July 1, 2008.
Product price formula Issues
Do Class III/IV prices reflect national supply and de-
mand conditions and plant operating costs for manu-
facturing use milk? When federal milk orders used
competitive pay prices (the M-W price and the BFP),
minimum class prices were tied to competitively-de-
termined prices paid by milk plants for manufacturing
milk. There was a certain sense of confidence associ-
ated with that linkage, as competition for the milk
supply tended to dictate plant margins, profitability
and viability. Efficient plants making the right prod-
ucts attracted milk away from plants that were less-ef-
ficient or making products with weak demand. This
confidence has waned since 2000 when federal orders
implemented product price formulas. Formulas derive
milk component values and milk prices through math-
ematical equations that employ assumed yields and
manufacturing costs. Milk plants differ significantly
with respect to manufacturing costs and efficiency.
Manufacturing costs can quickly change with changes
in energy, labor and other costs. The fixed manufac-
turing costs in the formulas can only change through
a lengthy administrative process. Plants cannot offset
higher manufacturing costs by increasing their selling
price of cheese, butter or nonfat dry milk—any price
increases are immediately reflected in higher NASS
product prices and elevate minimum pay prices for
Class III and Class IV milk through the formulas.
Do formulas use the right dairy products? Cheddar
32 DAIRY POLICY ISSUES
cheese, butter, nonfat dry milk and dry whey prices
are used in the current product price formulas.
Do the prices of these products accurately reflect the
value of milk for Class III and Class IV uses? Ched-
dar cheese only represents 32 percent of total cheese
production. Not all cheese plants process whey or
make and sell dry whey. Increasingly larger volumes
of whey are being processed into value-added prod-
ucts such as whey protein concentrates and whey pro-
tein isolates. The prices of these value-added products
don’t necessarily move in concert with dry whey
prices. Dry whey is used to derive the other solids
price in the Class III formula. When dry whey prices
increased dramatically in 2007, a higher other solids
price was responsible for a large part of the elevated
Class III price. As a result, many cheese plants expe-
rienced unfavorable operating margins. A similar
situation is occurring with nonfat dry milk. During
2007-2008 the U.S. experienced expanding exports
of skim milk powder. Skim milk powder has a differ-
ent composition than nonfat dry milk and prices are
influenced by different factors. But nonfat dry milk is
used to derive the nonfat solids price in the Class IV
formula.
Are product prices representative? Product price for-
mulas require reliable and representative market
prices for dairy products in order to derive accurate
component values. Butter and cheese prices are tied
strongly to wholesale prices on the Chicago Mercan-
tile Exchange (CME). But largely because of con-
cerns over the thinness of the CME cheese and butter
markets (few traders and a small percentage of the
dairy product actually traded), prices reported by
NASS are used instead. NASS collects actual sales
prices from reporting plants, but does not include
contract sales with prices longer than 30 days.
Despite criticism of the CME butter and cheese mar-
kets, the industry uses CME prices as formal or infor-
mal references in establishing actual selling prices for
the vast majority of transactions. This raises impor-
tant questions. Do CME prices accurately reflect
broad market conditions or are they subject to manip-
ulation? Should the prices in forward pricing con-
tracts be included in NASS reporting? Since NASS
reported prices lag CME and actual selling prices,
would using CME prices in formulas yield Class III
and Class IV values more responsive to rapidly-
changing market conditions? Would some other re-
ported prices—such as futures market prices—better
reflect dairy product values?
Alternatives to current product price
formulas
The inherent problems and issues with the current
product price formulas have spurred interest in ex-
ploring a different means for establishing minimum
Class III and Class IV prices and moving prices for
Class II and Class III. Some alternatives to consider
include:
• Amend current product price formulas: Consid-
eration could be given to including other products in
the formulas, such mozzarella cheese and whey pro-
tein concentrates. However, these products are not as
standardized as is cheddar cheese or dry whey. Also,
manufacturing cost could be adjusted more quickly
by indexing input costs such as energy and labor in
the formulas. But the issue of differences in costs and
efficiencies among plants remains.
• Use economic index formulas:: As noted earlier,
economic index formulas were widely used in setting
minimum federal order prices during the 1940’s and
1950’s. Economic formulas can consider a large num-
ber of factors reflecting general economic conditions
and supply and demand for milk and dairy products.
But assigning appropriate weights to factors is an
issue and it is uncertain whether prices resulting
from economic formulas would adequately reflect
dairy product market conditions and allow these
markets to clear.
• Include milk production costs when setting
prices: Dairy producers argue that federal order
prices ought to reflect the cost to produce milk.
Changing federal order prices to reflect changes in
milk production costs would reduce the price risk
now faced by dairy producers. This could very well
spur expanded milk production beyond market needs
and increase government cost under the dairy prod-
ucts price support program, or necessitate some type
of government supply management. Further, milk
production costs vary considerably among dairy pro-
ducers within and across regions. Using an average
cost of production would favor low cost producers
and regions and could still be judged inadequate by
producers in high cost regions.
• Return to a competitive pay price:With practi-
cally all of the nation’s milk production Grade A,
there is not enough Grade B milk to base a competi-
tive pay price. Not all Grade Amilk is regulated
under orders, but unregulated Grade Amilk may not
be produced in areas of strong plant competition for
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milk. Areas where most of the regulated Grade Amilk
is used to make manufactured dairy products and suf-
ficient plant competition exist could be considered for
determining a competitive Grade A pay price. Regu-
lated manufacturing milk plants could be exempted
from paying minimum Class III and Class IV prices.
The actual pay price by these exempt plants could
then be used as the competitive pay prices for setting
the minimum Class III and Class IV prices and mov-
ing Class I and Class II. To be feasible, this option
would need to include some provision for exempt
manufacturing plants to share in the federal order
pool.
• Pool differentials/no minimum Class III and
Class IV price: Under this option there would be no
established monthly minimum plant pay prices for
Class III and Class IV milk. Milk plants would pay
whatever market competition dictated and report
Class III and Class IV milk volumes to the federal
order pool. Milk plants with Class I and Class II milk
would pay into the federal order pool the respective
Class I and Class II differentials on Class I and Class
II milk volumes. The sum of this Class I and Class II
differential revenue would be divided by the total vol-
ume of milk in the pool to determine a market wide
uniform Class I/II value per hundredweight to be paid
to dairy producers. Under competition the low cost
and more efficient plants would most likely drive ac-
tual pay prices. Without announced minimum prices
for Class I and Class II milk, dairy cooperatives could
find it more difficult to negotiate over order premi-
ums. The cost of raw milk to competing Class I bot-
tlers could also differ among bottlers.
• Set prices through Federal order hearings: Fed-
eral order prices could be determined by having
USDA periodically hold hearings and issue minimum
prices based on the hearing record. Hearings could be
time consuming and costly for regulated handlers.
Further, unless hearings were held frequently, estab-
lished minimum prices could become quickly out of
date.
Setting Class I differentials
Historical review
The following criteria have been used in the past to
establish Class I differentials:
• The additional cost of meeting Grade A (versus
Grade B) standards.7
• Costs of transporting milk from areas of production
to areas of consumption.
• Cost of producing milk in the supply area.
• Supply and demand for milk, including the cost of
alternative supplies.
Class I differentials are set for each federal order and
aligned between orders. Within a market area differ-
entials decrease with distance from a major consump-
tion location. This is to partially account for the cost
of moving milk to the consumption location. Align-
ment of Class I differentials between federal orders
was intended to assure orderly movement of milk
from reserve areas to deficit areas when needed.
By the early 1960’s it was recognized that improved
transportation and packaging technology had made
markets for manufacturing dairy products national in
scope. Federal orders were gradually amended to use
the same minimum price for manufacturing use
milk—Class III—in all orders and to use the Class III
price to move the Class I price. The Minnesota-Wis-
consin (M-W) Grade B price series was initially
adopted to serve this purpose.
Over time, Class I differentials were set to establish
Eau Claire, Wisconsin, as a single basing point to
align Class I prices among orders east of the Rocky
Mountains. In the 1960s, Wisconsin and Minnesota
were the principal source of reserve Grade Amilk
when need to provide supplemental milk for fluid use
in other markets. Class I differentials increased about
15 cents per hundredweight per 100 miles with dis-
tance from Eau Claire, which was roughly equivalent
to hauling costs for bulk milk shipments. These dif-
ferentials remained unchanged from 1968 to 1985 de-
spite increases in transportation costs. The rationale
for keeping differentials constant was that Federal
order prices were minimum prices, and dairy coopera-
tives could negotiate premiums to cover the added
cost of transporting milk. Further, less and less re-
serve Grade Amilk from the Upper Midwest was
needed to supply distant markets.
In 1985, Congress passed legislation that increased
differentials for federal order markets distant from the
Upper Midwest. By the late 1980s, milk production in
the traditional dairy states like Minnesota and Wis-
consin was stabilizing or declining while milk pro-
duction in some other states with much higher Class I
differentials, for example Texas, was increasing. Re-
serve supplies of milk for Class I use outside of the
Upper Midwest were also increasing.
The Upper Midwest charged that higher Class I dif-
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ferentials were encouraging expanded milk produc-
tion not needed for Class I. The excess milk was
being allocated to manufactured dairy products, low-
ering market prices and producer milk prices in areas
where the majority of milk was used to make manu-
factured dairy products. In 1990, USDA held a na-
tional federal order hearing to review Class I pricing.
USDA’s decision was to retain existing Class I differ-
entials. A suit challenging the legality of Class I dif-
ferentials was filed by the Minnesota Milk Producers
Association in early 1990. The suit was ultimately
dismissed in 1999 after several appeals, reversals, and
remands.
The Federal Agricultural Improvement and Reform
Act of 1996 mandated federal order reform including
a review of the structure of Class I differentials. After
extensive study, USDA issued a final rule for a much
flatter Class I price structure. The final rule was ap-
proved by producers in an August 1999 referendum.
However, before the modified price surface could be
implemented, Congress intervened, passing legisla-
tion that required USDA to adopt a price surface more
similar to the status quo.
A federal order hearing was held in May 2007 to con-
sider proposals to raise Class I differentials in three
deficit federal orders—Florida, Southeast and Ap-
palachian. Justification for the increases was to attract
and allocate Grade Amilk to Class I needs. USDA is-
sued an interim final rule granting the proposed in-
creases in March, 2008. These increases changed the
alignment of Class prices in adjoining orders, leading
to requests for hearings to increase Class I differen-
tials in these orders as well.
Issues with Class I differentials
Existing Class I differentials range from $1.60 per
hundredweight in parts of the Upper Midwest order to
$6.00 for Miami. Considering the availability of milk
supplies nationally and the ability to transport raw
milk as well as packaged beverage milk products, the
rationale for these differentials can be questioned on
several grounds:
• Adequacy of milk supplies for Class I needs: In
2009, Class I utilization for the 10 existing orders av-
eraged 37 percent with a high of 86 percent for the
Florida order to a low of 14 percent for the Upper
Midwest order. Only three of the 10 orders—Florida,
Appalachian and Southeast—have insufficient local
supplies of milk to meet Class I needs year-round.
There are considerable seasonal differences in the ad-
equacy of local milk supplies in these three markets,
with major shortages in mid-summer and early fall
and excess supplies during the winter and spring. But
regardless of season, the national supply of Grade A
milk to meet fluid needs is more than ample. The
issue here is whether the geographical structure of
Class I prices should encourage an adequate supply of
fluid milk at the local level or at the national level.
• Preference for local milk: Related to the issue
above is whether consumers prefer local milk to milk
acquired from distant markets and what cost they are
willing to bear to promote local self-sufficiency in
fluid milk. Contrary to the early days of federal or-
ders, modern transportation and packaging methods
allow raw milk and packaged beverage milk to be
transported long distances without negatively affect-
ing milk quality. This calls into question the need to
have local milk supplies to assure wholesome fluid
milk products. And even if local supplies are judged
to be preferable, it is doubtful that Class I differentials
in seasonally-deficit milk markets can be increased
enough to achieve year-round self-sufficiency without
encountering serious inefficiencies. Year-round self-
sufficiency would require higher costs to either trans-
port milk out of the market during seasonal surplus
periods or to construct and operate manufacturing
plants to handle the seasonal surplus locally. Rather
than increasing Class I differentials to induce high-
cost local production, would obtaining milk from
reserve markets be a better option?
• Single basing point: The Upper Midwest is no
longer the major source of reserve Grade Amilk. The
related question is why Class I differentials should in-
crease with distance from the Upper Midwest to re-
flect the cost of transporting raw milk that is seldom
if ever transported. Should multiple basing points be
established to reflect the location of other reserve sup-
plies?
• Allocating Grade A supplies to Class I use:
Grade Amilk supplies are more than adequate for
Class I needs and Class I differentials result in Class I
typically being the highest class price. Nevertheless,
Class I needs are not always readily satisfied, even in
low Class I utilization markets. Regulated manufac-
turing plants within in an order market area are often
reluctant to give up milk to Class I bottlers. This
problem is most serious during summer and fall
months, when milk production is seasonally low and
manufacturing plants need to build inventory of butter
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and cheese for fall and early winter sales. Plus operat-
ing a plant at significantly less than capacity increases
average manufacturing costs. Increasing Class I dif-
ferentials is not likely to remedy this problem. Other
means need to be considered such as imposing ship-
ping requirements on supply plant to meet Class I
needs, implementing market administrator “call”
provisions to require supply plants to ship milk when
needed, providing adequate transportation allowances
for transporting milk to bottlers and compensating
supply plants for the cost of operating at reduced
capacity. Similar means need to be considered for
allocating reserve milk supplies to deficit markets.
• Negotiated over order premiums: Federal order
prices are minimum prices and not always effective
prices. This allows for dairy cooperatives supplying
fluid milk plants to negotiate premiums that reflect
market conditions and compensate for costs associ-
ated with transporting milk, balancing functions and
other market wide services. The vast majority of
Grade Amilk is marketed by dairy cooperatives.
The question is, do higher Class I differentials reduce
the ability of dairy cooperatives to negotiate premi-
ums, and if so, would raising differentials reduce
their ability to perform market-wide services that
enhance the ability of federal orders to meet their
stated objectives?
Number of Milk Classes
As part of federal milk marketing order reform man-
dated by the 1996 Farm Bill, federal orders estab-
lished four uniform classes of milk use. Dairy
products within each of the four use classes were
defined identically across all federal orders. The ap-
propriateness of this four class system is now being
questioned. A key question relates to the relative price
elasticity of demand for various dairy products. The
assumption that demand for beverage milk is more
inelastic that the demand for manufactured dairy
products is the basis for price discrimination—setting
a higher minimum price for milk assigned to bever-
age use. Is that assumption still valid? Another issue
is what products to use in setting classified prices in
pricing formulas. Hundreds of cheese varieties are
made today, yet only cheddar cheese is considered in
establishing the minimum Class III price. Modern
technology allows milk components to be separated
into refined components for a variety of uses in milk
products and other food products. Some argue that
there ought to be more classes to reflect this much
broader use of milk and milk components. Others
argue that there is already too much difficulty and
controversy over how to establish minimum prices for
the four classes currently used, and any expansion of
classes would only make matters worse. It would be
extremely difficult, if not impossible to establish sep-
arate classes for all of the possible uses of milk and
setting the appropriate minimum pay price for each
class. Attempting to do so may be over-regulation of
milk pricing. Some are suggesting a better approach
may be to return to the two class system, one for bev-
erage use milk and one for milk used for all types of
manufactured dairy products including existing Class
II products.
Historical review of multiple classes
While it was institutionalized with federal and state
milk marketing orders, classified pricing pre-dates or-
ders. In the 1920’s, some dairy cooperatives imple-
mented a two class pricing system in an attempt to
reduce the seasonal swings in milk prices. A higher
price was negotiated for milk used for beverage pur-
poses and a lower price for milk used to manufactur-
ing dairy products, primarily cheese and butter. With
beverage milk having a more inelastic demand than
manufactured dairy products the average milk price
was higher under this two class system than under flat
pricing. However, dairy cooperatives lacking suffi-
cient market share of raw milk had limited success in
holding all milk plants to a two price system. Dairy
cooperatives as well as milk plants in general sup-
ported the passage of the Agricultural Marketing
Agreement Act of 1937 which authorized federal milk
marketing orders.
Initially, federal orders used a two class system, one
for beverage use milk (Class I) and another for all
manufacturing use milk (Class II), with Class I priced
higher than Class II. Factors justifying the higher
Class I price were: beverage milk has a more inelastic
demand than manufactured dairy products so charg-
ing a higher price benefits producers through price
discrimination; milk for beverage use must be Grade
A, so producers should be compensated for the higher
cost to produce Grade A versus Grade B milk; and
producers should be compensated for the higher cost
of transporting Grade Amilk to city bottling plants
rather than to the corner creamery or cheese factory.
Later, a third class was added for milk used to manu-
facture soft products such as ice cream, cream prod-
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ucts, cottage cheese and condensed milk products.
This was justified on grounds that soft products were
more perishable than other manufactured dairy prod-
ucts. Until the early 1990s, most federal orders used
the three class system with Class I being beverage
milk products, Class II soft manufactured products,
and Class III cheese, butter and nonfat dry milk.
The three class system work fairly well for more than
30 years. But by 1993, there was agitation in some
federal orders to include a fourth class—Class III-
A—for milk used to make butter and nonfat dry milk.
Proponents argued that butter-powder plants could
not afford to pay as much for milk as cheese plants
because of chronically lower market returns for butter
and nonfat dry milk. In addition, dairy cooperatives
provided a market-wide service of balancing the
Class I milk supply by operating butter-powder plants
to absorb milk on days that bottlers did not operate
and to adjust for seasonal milk supply-demand imbal-
ances. This balancing service benefited all producers
but at a cost to members of the cooperatives because
the butter-powder plants had to operate at widely-
fluctuating levels of full capacity. Class III-A was
deemed a way for all producers within the federal
order to share balancing costs. Federal order reform
effective January 1, 2000 continued the four class
system with Class IV replacing Class III-A.
During most of the time the federal order three class
system was in place, the monthly minimum Class III
price and the mover of the Class I and Class II prices
were set using a competitive pay price—the Min-
nesota-Wisconsin Manufacturing Grade Milk Price,
or M-W. The M-W was calculated by USDA as an av-
erage of Grade B producer milk prices paid by butter-
powder and cheese plants located in the two states.
Under this system plant competition helped to assure
that milk used in Class III moved to its highest and
best use. If cheese generated higher returns that did
butter-powder production, more milk would be allo-
cated to cheese and vice versa. This changed with the
1993 implementation of a fourth class, Class III-A in
some orders. With two classes for manufacturing use
milk, Class III and Class III-A, coupled with market-
wide pooling there was less incentive for manufactur-
ing milk plants to allocate milk to the highest and best
use. For example, from 1993 to 1995 U.S. milk pro-
duction grew 3.1 percent. But nonfat dry milk pro-
duction grew by 29 percent and government stocks of
nonfat dry milk under the federal dairy prices support
program increased by 419 percent.
Federal order reform in 2000 implemented the four
class system for all federal milk marketing orders.
Further the competitive pay price series for setting the
minimum Class III and Class IV prices and movers of
Class II and Class I was replaced with product price
formulas having fixed make allowances and product
yields. Product price formulas appear to have further
reduced the incentive to move milk between Class III
and Class IV. Even though butter-powder prices may
be depressed relative to cheese prices, there is little
incentive to allocate more milk to cheese as long as
butter-powder plants are profitable with the fixed
make allowances.
Issues with the four class system
Enhancing dairy producer revenue: Classified
pricing is price discrimination that is assumed to
enhance dairy producer revenue. In order for price
discrimination to benefit producers, the price elastic-
ity of demand for the dairy products in the different
classes of milk must be different and the price for the
class containing the products with the most inelastic
demand must be higher. Historical studies docu-
mented that beverage milk products in Class I had a
more inelastic demand than manufactured products
like butter and cheese. Thus producer revenue would
be enhanced with Class I having the highest mini-
mum price. While beverage milk demand may still
be more inelastic than, say, demand for cheese, it
may be less inelastic today and the differences in
elasticity between beverage milk and cheese may
also be less.8 Elasticity values need to be frequently
re-evaluated to ensure that relative federal order
prices benefit producers.
It is questionable whether having a separate Class II
for soft manufactured products adds much to pro-
ducer revenue. Class II is priced just $0.70 per hun-
dredweight above an advanced Class IV price. For
2009, Class II utilizations ranged from a low of 4 per-
cent for the Upper Midwest Order to a high of 20 per-
cent for the Northeast Order with a weighted average
of 12 percent for all 10 orders.
Improving dairy price stability: One objective of
federal milk marketing orders is to help stabilize pro-
ducer milk prices. However, having three separate
classes for manufactured products along with using
market-wide pooling and product price formulas with
fixed make allowances and yields and may actually
add to price instability. Separate classes for milk used
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for manufacturing may also slow the recovery from
low producer pay prices. Because of fixed manufac-
turing allowances, there is little incentive for some
plants to allocate milk quickly to the highest and best
use. Product price formulas may hinder the ability
and incentive of manufacturing milk plants to attract
more milk during periods of higher product prices.
For example, when cheese prices strengthen relative
to butter and nonfat dry milk prices the product price
formula uses the higher cheese price resulting in a
higher cost of milk to the cheese plant with the net ef-
fect of no improvement in plant margin. Likewise the
butter-powder plant can optimize plant margins by
operating at near full plant capacity and therefore has
little incentive to release milk to a cheese plant.
Effectiveness of the federal dairy product price
support program: Having one manufacturing class
for butter and nonfat dry milk and another for cheese
may lessen the effectiveness of the Dairy Product
Price Support Program discussed earlier. For exam-
ple, with product price formulas the cheese plant has
a fixed make allowance (plant margin) regardless of
the price of cheese. And with market-wide pooling
the cheese plant is able to compete with the butter-
powder plant for raw milk. The combining of Class
III and IV into one manufacturing class may increase
the competition for milk used for butter and nonfat
dry milk versus cheese, thus making the dairy product
support program more effective. The CCC purchase
price for cheese may return the cheese plant a better
margin than the market price for cheese, enabling the
plant to better compete with a butter-powder plant for
raw milk.
Is a separate Class IV needed for balancing? The
argument in 1993 for establishing a Class III-A for
butter and nonfat dry milk was partly one of compen-
sating dairy cooperatives for balancing the Class I
market. Compared to making cheese, surplus milk
can more readily be manufactured into nonfat dry
milk for longer term storage. There is a cost to dairy
cooperatives to perform this balancing function yet all
dairy producers within the given federal order market
benefit. With a separate Class III-A and now Class IV,
all producers within the federal order market share in
the cost of this balancing. However, a better alterna-
tive than having two separate classes for hard manu-
factured products may be for the federal order to
provide market-wide service payments out of the fed-
eral order pool to compensate dairy cooperatives for
balancing. Dairy cooperatives also can and do negoti-
ate over order premiums. These premiums are in part
compensation for balancing and other services.
Establishing appropriate minimum class prices:
If milk is to be effectively allocated to its highest and
best use, having appropriate minimum class prices is
critical. As noted above, the method of establishing
minimum prices for Class III and Class IV has been
controversial. With more manufacturing classes,
problems could be amplified.
To illustrate, consider the calculation of the Class III
price. The Class III price is the sum of three milk
component values using USDA-NASS monthly aver-
age product prices in the product price formulas: (1)
the butterfat price per pound based on the Grade AA
butter price; (2) the protein price per pound based on
cheddar cheese 40-pound block and barrel prices and
the Grade AA butter price; (3) the other solids price
based on the price of dry whey. Many questions can
be raised about this method of deriving a minimum
Class III price. Protein is based solely on the price of
cheddar cheese, but hundreds of cheese varieties are
made. The other solids price is based solely on the
dry whey price, yet many cheese plants don’t make
dry whey. In addition, modern technology allows for
the separation and fractionation of milk components
into various milk proteins and protein isolates having
different uses and values. Consequently, expanding
the number of manufacturing classes to reflect this
multitude of uses and attempting to develop appropri-
ate product price formulas for each class would be a
seemingly impossible task. Furthermore, additional
manufacturing classes would not assure milk is bet-
ter-allocated to the highest and best use.
Combining all milk used to make manufactured dairy
products into one class does not make establishing an
appropriate minimum price for the combined class
easy. One approach may be to use a weighted average
of several product price formulas. A better approach
to consider would be replacing product price formulas
with a competitive pay price series derived from a
survey of actual raw milk pay prices from milk plants
manufacturing a wide array of dairy products.
Dairy product innovation: Some argue that the ex-
isting four class system in federal marketing orders
curtails dairy product innovation. This issue pertains
both to how milk is classified as Class I and the three
classes for milk used for manufactured products. For
example, innovators may be reluctant to use milk pro-
teins for a new beverage product if the new product
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will be classified as Class I. This could make the
product more costly than using vegetable proteins
as an alternative. Deriving a minimum pay price for
each separate manufacturing use of milk may have
similar effect, especially if the correct milk products
or milk components are not considered. Milk compo-
nent values do not always move together. For exam-
ple, in 2007 the price of dry whey increased substan-
tially relative to prices for whey protein concentrates.
Since only dry whey is used in the Class III calcula-
tion, milk plants making whey protein concentrates
were at a competitive disadvantage to those making
dry whey. Perhaps this problem could be minimized
by a change in the Class III product price formula.
But federal milk marketing orders disincentives to
dairy product innovation can best be eliminated by
having one manufacturing milk class and using some
type of competitive pay price to set the minimum
class price.
Pooling
Pooling issues have been frequent topics of discus-
sion, especially since federal order reform was imple-
mented in January 2000. Particularly controversial are
depooling and distant pooling, both of which affect
federal order producer prices. Numerous questions
have been raised related to what is pooling, which
producers are eligible to share in federal order pools,
what is a pool milk plant, how do regulated manufac-
turing milk plants decide to pool or depool, and how
does pooling affect producer pay prices, in particular
the producer price differential (PPD) and the uniform
price.
The terms pool, pooled and pooling have several
meanings within federal orders, which leads to some
confusion. Pooling refers to both milk and money. A
federal order milk pool refers to the amount of milk
eligible to share in the federal order money pool. A
federal order money pool is the amount of money
generated by applying minimum federal order Class
prices to the amount of milk used in each Class
within an order.
Each federal order has a marketing area. Amarketing
area is defined as a geographical area where fluid
milk plants compete for sales of Class I milk.9 The
marketing area is not where milk is produced; it is
where fluid milk is sold. Pooling involves the associa-
tion of both locally produced milk (milk produced
within the market area) and more distant milk with
pool plants.
Three types of milk handlers can be designated pool
plants under an order:
1) Distributing plants: Plants that process, package
and sell beverage milk products within the designated
marketing area. Distributing plants may procure milk
directly from producers or obtain milk from supply
plants and cooperatives.
2) Supply plants: Plants that supply raw Grade A
milk to distributing plants. These are manufacturing
milk plants, like cheese plants, that procure milk di-
rectly from producers or obtain milk from coopera-
tives. While engaged primarily in manufacturing,
supply plants help assure an adequate supply of milk
for fluid purposes by carrying a fluid milk reserves.
Supply plants also provide a balancing service by
manufacturing milk that is not needed for fluid pur-
poses on days when bottling plants are not operating
and handling seasonal surpluses.
3) Dairy cooperatives: Some dairy cooperatives bot-
tle milk and others have manufacturing facilities.
Other cooperatives are involved in exclusively in rep-
resenting their members in negotiations with propri-
etary firms. Dairy cooperatives, like other handlers
are obligated to the federal order pool for the estab-
lished minimum prices. But, cooperatives are not ob-
ligated to pay their member-producers the order
minimum producer prices. Cooperatives often “re-
blend” the proceeds from milk sales across two or
more federal order markets and pay their members
prices in different regions that reflect different com-
petitive conditions.
Whether or not a milk plant or dairy cooperative is a
pool plant, i.e., a regulated handler under a specific
federal order, hinges on whether the plant meets the
order’s performance requirements. Performance re-
quirements for distributing plants are different from
those applying to supply plants and cooperatives. For
distributing plants, performance requirements pertain
to the percentage of the plant’s packaged milk that is
distributed within the marketing area. If the distribut-
ing plant meets the required minimum distribution
percentage under the order, it is pooled—there is no
choice in the matter. Pooling is required because fed-
eral orders assure that all fluid milk handlers have the
same minimum cost of raw Grade Amilk to prevent
one handler from gaining a competitive advantage
over another in processing and selling packaged milk
within the market area.
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For supply plants and dairy cooperatives, perform-
ance requirements are called shipping requirements,
and relate to the percentage of their milk receipts that
must be shipped to a distributing plants. But, unlike
distributing plants, supply plants and cooperatives can
decide whether they wish to meet the shipping re-
quirements or not. The minimum shipping percent-
ages required of supply plants or cooperatives vary by
federal milk order. Shipping requirements depend
upon the local supply of milk in relation to Class I
milk needs. In federal milk orders with relatively high
Class I utilization, like the Southeast, Appalachian
and Florida orders, the shipping requirements are
higher than orders with relatively low Class I utiliza-
tion, like the Upper Midwest order.
Shipping requirements also may vary by months of
the year. In the South and Southeast milk production
is very seasonal, with production dropping off sub-
stantially during summer and fall to the point that lo-
cally produced milk is short of meeting Class I needs
and some distant milk must be purchased by distribut-
ing plants. Shipping requirements are higher during
those months.
The incentive for supply plants and dairy coopera-
tives to meet shipping requirements and become
pooled under a given order is sharing in the order’s
money pool. Each regulated handler is obligated to
pay the established monthly minimum prices for the
four classes of milk according to their milk receipts
for the month, which makes up the federal order
money pool. The federal order money pool is divided
by the federal order milk pool to derive a weighted
average value of milk for the entire order, called uni-
form price. All pool handlers within the order pay
producers this same uniform price.
Producers affiliated with pooled handlers individually
receive this uniform price (adjusted for milk composi-
tion and quality), regardless of how their milk handler
uses the producers’ milk (i.e., to which Class their
milk is assigned. This is possible through the use of a
producer settlement fund. The federal order market
administrator calculates the weighted average value
of milk for each pooled plant, applying the minimum
class prices to the volume of milk used by the handler
in each class. If a handler’s weighted average milk
value is greater than the uniform price for the entire
order (usually a Class I bottler), then the handler will
pay the difference into a producer settlement fund,
that is the difference multiplied by the handler’s pro-
ducer deliveries for the month. If the handler’s
weighted average milk value is less than the uniform
price for the entire order (usually a manufacturing
plant such as a cheese plant), then the handler draws
out of the producer settlement fund the difference
times its producer deliveries.
Eligibility to receive this pool draw is the primary
reason that cheese plants seek pool status under the
order. These plants are interested in making cheese,
not supplying milk for Class I use. But their limited
commitment to service the Class I market and the as-
sociated pool draw provides them with revenue to pay
their producers beyond what they receive from selling
cheese and whey.
Issues with pooling
Major pooling issues concern what milk can or must
be pooled, both locally produced milk and distant
milk, and depooling.
Pooling locally produced milk. A major objective of
federal milk marketing orders is to assure consumers
of an adequate supply of Grade Amilk for beverage
use. When federal orders were initially implemented,
the majority of milk produced was Grade B, which
was not eligible for use in packaged fluid milk prod-
ucts. Grade Amilk received a premium above Grade
B. Through time, the differences between Grade B
and Grade A standards narrowed. In the 1950’s, the
movement from can-shipped milk to bulk milk tanks
on the farm often required modernization of the milk
house which helped Grade B producers to meet Grade
A standards. With premiums paid for Grade Amilk,
the narrowing of Grade B and Grade A standards and
conversion to bulk tanks, more and more of the milk
production became Grade A. Today, 97 percent of
nation’s milk production is Grade A and eligible to
be pooled under a federal milk order. But, of the 10
existing federal orders only three—the Appalachian,
Southeast and Florida orders—have Class I utilization
of 65 percent or higher with an average of 37 percent
across all 10 orders. In six of the federal orders Class
III utilization exceeds or is close to the Class I utiliza-
tion. In general there is more Grade Amilk pooled
under federal orders than what is required to meet
Class I needs and having a reasonable Grade A re-
serve. As more and more Grade Amilk became
pooled under a federal order the Class I utilization de-
clined lowering the uniform price paid to producers
associated with a regulated handler.
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Producers under federal milk marketing orders are
dairy farmers who are eligible to share in federal
order money pool. To be designed as a producer
under an order a percentage of the producer’s milk
must be delivered to an order distributing pool plant.
As more Grade Amilk became pooled under a federal
milk order, both the performance requirements and
shipping requirements were lowered since a smaller
percentage of producers’ Grade Amilk was required
to meet Class I needs. Today, with almost all milk
Grade A, this required delivery percentage has been
lowered to the point where low Class I utilization fed-
eral milk orders like the Upper Midwest require that
just one day per year of a producer’s milk production
be delivered to an order pool distributing plant to
meet qualification requirements. This is often called
“touching base”. After touching base, the pool plant
may thereafter divert the producer’s milk to a non-
pool plant (i.e., a milk plant that is not regulated by
the order) and the producer continues to remain eligi-
ble to share in the federal order money pool.
Unrestricted pooling is inefficient in that it involves
expensive transportation of milk simply to meet order
performance standards. But at the same time, unre-
stricted pooling is equitable in the sense of allowing
any Grade Amilk plant to become a pool plant. The
question becomes whether all manufacturing milk
plants purchasing Grade Amilk from producers
should be eligible to pool under a federal milk order.
If not, then what criteria should be used to establish
pooling eligibility—location of potential supply
plants relative to distributing plants, plant size, prod-
ucts manufactured? Whatever criteria is used, effi-
ciency gains would come at the expense of equity
losses.
Producer-Handler Exemptions.Another local pool-
ing issue relates to the treatment of producer-han-
dlers, dairy producers who process and sell packaged
fluid milk. Federal orders have historically not re-
quired producer handlers to account to the pool for
Class I sales provided that all of their sales come
from milk produced on the farm.
Until recently, producer-handlers were mostly dairy
farmers with on-farm sales or limited local distribu-
tion. Hence, their exemption had little impact on the
size of the money pool for the markets in which they
operated. However, some larger producer-handlers
began to show up, some with herds holding thousands
of cows. Class I sales from these operations displaced
large volumes of sales from regulated distributing
plants, significantly cutting market Class I utilization
and producer revenue. Large sales of packaged fluid
milk products in California by an Arizona producer-
handler exempt under the Arizona-Las Vegas order
led Congress to pass a law in 2006 (PL 109-215) that
forced regulation of the operation. At about the same
time, USDA issued a final rule that set a 3 million
pound per month limit for exemption of producer-
handlers in the Arizona-Las Vegas and Pacific North-
west orders. And in March 2010, USDA extended the
limit to all federal orders.
At issue here is what constitutes closing a loophole
that allows evasion of legitimate federal order
payments and results in unfair competition versus
imposing unfair restrictions on dairy farmers’ entre-
preneurialism. The USDA cap still exempts producer-
handlers with dairy herds smaller than about 1,500
cows, a large majority of existing dairy farms. And
most farms with herds larger than the cap are not and
have no interest in becoming a producer-handler.
Hence, the cap would appear to be minimally
restrictive.
Pooling distant milk. Dairy cooperatives often pool
milk under more than one federal milk order. Distant
pooling—pooling milk under orders outside their area
of procurement—is advantageous to a cooperative if
the difference in the PPDs between the two orders is
more than enough to offset the hauling costs neces-
sary to meet the order’s touch base producer qualifi-
cation standard. With the one-time touch base
producer qualification provision of the Upper Mid-
west order, it was economically advantageous for
dairy cooperatives and other plants located well out-
side the order marketing area to affiliate producers
and their milk and pool on the Upper Midwest order.
During the 2000 – 2003 period, cooperatives operat-
ing cheese plants as far away as Idaho pooled some of
their member-producer milk on the Upper Midwest
order. Once the one day touch base qualification was
met, the milk volume from these producers was
priced under the Upper Midwest order even though
no actual shipments subsequently occurred.
The pool qualification of the distant milk could be
through an Upper Midwest distributing plant. It could
also be through a supply plant or dairy cooperative
that had sufficient “cushion” in meeting the shipping
requirements of the Upper Midwest order—that is, a
pool plant that shipped more than the minimum re-
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quired shipping percentage to a distributing plant. The
plant that qualified the distant milk would receive a
fee for providing qualification.
The effect of distant pooling is to reduce the value of
the PPD in the receiving market. This occurs because
the milk pool is increased more than the money pool.
In 2003, distant milk from Idaho equaled 10.6 percent
of total producer receipts in the Upper Midwest order.
The Western order was terminated effective April 1,
2004. This raised concern that even more Idaho milk
would be pooled on the Upper Midwest order. Upper
Midwest dairy cooperatives requested a federal order
hearing to tighten pooling requirements. The Central
and Mideast orders followed with hearings in re-
sponse to large quantities of milk from Minnesota and
Wisconsin being pooled on these orders, reducing
Class I utilization and their PPD.
As a result of these hearings, federal orders were
amended to tighten pooling requirements. This was
primarily accomplished by requiring that pooled milk
could not be diverted for manufacturing to non-pool
plants located outside of the marketing area. While
this does not prohibit the pooling of distant milk on
the order, it substantially weakens the incentive to do
so because more distant milk would incur transporta-
tion costs.
Depooling: Since Class I milk and Class II skim milk
are advanced priced, elapse about six weeks between
the time these prices are announced and when the
Class III and Class IV prices are announced. If the
price of cheese during that six week period increases
enough to raise the Class III price by more than the
federal order Class I differential, then the Class III
price will exceed the Class I price. This yields a nega-
tive PPD. Pooled cheese plants, if staying pooled,
would pay into the producer settlement fund the dif-
ference between their higher weighted average milk
value and the uniform price for the order rather than
drawing from the producer settlement fund. But when
this happens, many cheese plants can and do elect to
depool from the order, effectively becoming an unreg-
ulated plant for the month. This causes higher volume
milk receipts in the order to decline, making the nega-
tive PPD even more negative. Taking the higher-
priced Class III milk out of the milk pool
substantially reduces the money pool and the
weighted average value of the milk that remains
pooled—the lower priced Class I milk is now a
greater percentage of the smaller pooled milk volume.
The largest recorded negative PPD in the Upper Mid-
west order was $4.11 in April 2004. The two-week
average cheese price used in deriving the April 2004
Class I skim milk price was $1.4582 per pound. The
four-week average cheese price used in deriving the
Class III price was $2.0520 per pound. So between
the times the Class I price was announced and the
Class III price announced, the cheese price increased
$0.5938 per pound. This resulted in the April 2004
Class I price (announced on March 19th) of $15.44
per hundredweight and the April Class III price (an-
nounced on April 30th) of $19.66 per hundredweight.
Because of this price inversion, most of the Class III
milk on the Upper Midwest order was depooled as
cheese plants avoided producer settlement fund pay-
ments.
While negative PPDs have periodically occurred
since then, they have not been as large. For the Upper
Midwest order negative PDDs occurred one month
during 2005, one month during 2007, and 5 months
during 2008. These negative PPDs ranged from $0.04
to $0.46 per hundredweight.
While there is still an incentive for cheese plants to
depool when PPDs are negative, federal order amend-
ments have reduced the incentive. Some amendments
prohibited “in and out” pooling. If a pool plant
(cheese plant) decides to depool during one month,
they can no longer re-pool the following month, but
rather have to stay depooled for a period of time. The
Upper Midwest order used a different approach. It
limits pooled milk in any month to a specified per-
centage of pooled milk in the previous month. So if a
plant depooled in one month, it could only partially
repool in the subsequent months.
A possible effect of restricting depooling is that
cheese plants might decide to permanently disaffiliate
from the order. In that case, the reserve supply of
Grade Amilk for Class I use would shrink and ship-
ping requirements for remaining pooled supply plants
and cooperatives would need to be increased.
Restricting depooling deals with the symptoms of the
problem rather than the cause. The problem is price
inversion caused by the combination of volatile
cheese prices and advanced Class I pricing. Federal
orders cannot address cheese price volatility, but they
could be altered to eliminate advanced Class I pric-
ing. If advanced pricing is retained and product price
formulas continue to be used to derive the Class I
mover, then using CME cheese prices rather than an-
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nounced NASS cheese prices would reduce the like-
lihood of price inversion. NASS prices are highly
correlated with CME prices lagged about two weeks.
The California milk pricing system uses CME prices
for butter and cheese in its pricing formulas. Resist-
ance to using CME prices in federal order formulas
would come from those concerned about the thinness
of the CME spot markets.
Endnotes
1About 3 percent of U.S. milk production is Grade B, which
can only be used for manufactured dairy products. Grade B
milk is not covered by Federal orders. Subsequent reference
to “milk” is Grade Amilk.
2 Other solids are milk solids other than protein and butterfat
and consist primarily of lactose.
3 The term, “at location,” means where the plant is situated
within the marketing area of the order; that is, the Class I
price applying to the county where the plant is located.
4 Four federal orders—Appalachia, Arizona, Florida and
Southeast—pay producers under fat/skim milk pricing.
5 Of the six federal milk marketing orders that pay producers
on the basis of milk components, four—Midest, Upper Mid-
west, Central, and Southwest—apply a somatic cell count ad-
justment.
6 The pool does not balance because the combined utilization
if the two handlers does not match utilization of milk as re-
flected by the producer price differential.
7 Grade A and Grade B quality standards are currently nearly
identical. The small amount of remaining Grade B milk
comes mainly from producers who are unable to meet physi-
cal standards such as cooling requirements (e.g., Amish farm-
ers who do not use mechanical refrigeration) or well location,
or from producers who ship their milk to cheese factories that
are not regulated under federal orders and are indifferent with
respect to grade as long as the milk meets quality standards
8 Some recent studies have estimated price elasticities of de-
mand for manufactured dairy products lower (in absolute
value) than the price elasticity of demand for fluid milk prod-
ucts. See, for example Chouinard, Hayley H., David E. Davis,
Jeffrey T. LaFrance, and Jeffrey M. Perloff, Milk Marketing
Order Winners and Losers, Applied Economics Perspectives
and Policy 32 (1), Spring 2010.
9With modern transportation and packaging it sis difficult to
determine where one market ends and another starts. In gen-
eral, a fluid milk plant is regulated by the order in which it has
the largest percentage of its fluid milk sales.
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Exports of dairy products have come to represent an
important market for U.S. dairy farmers. In 2008, the
milk equivalent of exports represented nearly 11 per-
cent of U.S. milk production. Large exports in 2007
and 2008 were a major factor underlying high farm-
level milk prices in those years, and the drop in ex-
ports in 2009 was a major reason milk prices
collapsed. This recent export experience demon-
strates the opportunities afforded by serving export
markets but also the potential price volatility in those
markets.
The U.S. has been a net exporter of dairy products
for many years on a volume basis but usually a net
importer on a value basis until 2007. This discrep-
ancy is due to differences in the composition of ex-
ports and imports. U.S. imports are largely in the
form of higher-valued cheese, milk protein concen-
trate and casein products while the bulk of U.S. dairy
exports are lower-valued nonfat dry milk and whey
products. Milk protein concentrate imports have gen-
erated vociferous complaints from dairy farmers be-
cause they are not subject to tariff rate quotas and
substitute for domestic milk protein in a large num-
ber of dairy and food manufacturing applications.
As a member of the World Trade Organization
(WTO) the United States is subject to rules and re-
strictions relating to market access, export subsidies,
and domestic agricultural programs that may distort
world trade. A new world trade pact—the Doha
WTO Round—has been in the process of negotiation
since 2001. While negotiations are currently stalled,
progress to date suggests that a completed round will
yield more dairy trade opportunities for the United
States but, at the same time, provide more open ac-
cess to dairy imports and limit options available for
supporting milk prices and dairy farmer income.
Historical Review1
U.S. dairy export value was essentially stagnant from
1993 through 2003 at about $1 billion. Over the
same period, the value of dairy imports about dou-
bled, resulting in an increasing dairy trade deficit
measured by value. Export growth exceeded import
growth from 2004 through 2006, narrowing the trade
gap, and in 2007, the U.S. became a large net ex-
porter of dairy products. The trade surplus was even
larger in 2008 before collapsing world markets
sharply cut the value of both imports and exports in
2009.
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The U.S. exports a wide variety of dairy prod-
ucts, but three—nonfat dry milk/skim milk pow-
der, dry whey products and cheese—accounted
for about 70 percent of total export value in 2009.
U.S. dairy products were shipped to 153 coun-
tries in 2009. The biggest customers are next
door. Mexico is our largest foreign market, and
its share of total exports has grown steadily since
implementation of the North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1995. Canada
accounted for 16.5 percent of 2009 dairy export
value. Other important buyers are East Asia
(primarily Japan, China and Korea) and six
Southeast Asian countries.
U.S. imports of dairy products are also diverse,
but cheese has long been the largest import item.
Cheese accounted for 43 percent of 2009 dairy
import value. Concentrated milk protein imports
followed cheese in importance with, a combined
30 percent of import value.
The U.S. imported dairy products from 88 coun-
tries in 2009. Imports were dominated by the EU
(principally cheese) Oceania, Canada and Mex-
ico. Italy, France and the Netherlands accounted
for about 60 percent of the value of imports from
the EU.
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Dairy Trade Issues
World Trade Organization Issues
The current WTO round was formally initiated with
a declaration in November 2001 during a ministerial
meeting held in Doha, Qatar. The agricultural negoti-
ations had started months earlier under the Agree-
ment on Agriculture. Since the Doha declaration,
ministerials have been held in Cancun in 2003,
Geneva in 2004 and Hong Kong in 2005.
There are three “pillars” included in the WTO agri-
cultural negotiations:
• Market Access. Prior to the Uruguay Round Agri-
cultural Agreement (URAA) many agricultural prod-
uct imports were restricted by quotas or other types
of non-tariff instruments. The Uruguay round con-
verted all non-tariff barriers into tariff equivalents in
a process called “tariffication.” This process at-
tempted to create a tariff that would leave the ratio of
the internal price to world price unchanged from
what existed under the non-tariff instrument. Besides
the conversion of non-tariff barriers, the URAA en-
sured that access to markets did not decline under
tariffication by the introduction of tariff-rate quotas
(TRQs) that had a lower in-quota tariff rate. The tar-
iffs established under the URAAwere then cut on
average by 36 percent (at least 15 percent for each
product) over five years (1995-2000) for developed
countries and by 24 percent (at least 10 percent for
each product) over ten years (1995-2004) for devel-
oping countries. Least developed countries were not
required to make tariff cuts under the URAA. There
were special safeguard provisions in the URAA that
allowed governments to take action in cases of rap-
idly declining prices or surges in imports. The
URAA set the stage for future trade rounds to deal
more easily with market access issues since market
access became increasingly transparent with non-tar-
iff barriers removed.
Although agricultural products are now only pro-
tected by tariffs in most cases, many tariffs remain at
levels that are high enough to prevent meaningful
market access. The numerous proposals on market
access reform under the Doha round have called for
further reductions in tariffs in an effort to achieve
greater progress in expanding agricultural trade.
Early in the Doha round, some countries proposed
that cuts in tariffs should not be from the URAA
bound rates but from applied tariff rates, the rate
countries actually impose on goods. In many cases,
the applied rates are well below their respective
bound rates, so there is no additional market access
opportunity until the bound rate is reduced to below
the applied rate. There are many other issues related
to tariff reductions that range from domestic food se-
curity to tariff escalation that occurs in an attempt to
protect processing industries. There have been many
different proposals offered to cut tariffs. They all dif-
fer in the degree in which they attempt to equalize
tariffs over time. The Swiss formula, for example,
provides for a narrow range of final tariffs and a
maximum final tariff rate. The latest Doha proposals
have looked at bands that cut the largest tariffs by the
largest percentage and smaller tariffs by a smaller
percentage in an attempt to harmonize rates. Further
market access issues identified in the Doha round in-
clude tariff quotas, tariff quota administration, spe-
cial safeguards and state trading enterprises.
Under most Doha proposals, additional market ac-
cess for most U.S. dairy product markets will occur.
This additional access will tend to lower U.S. prices.
Perhaps more important will be reductions in U.S.
tariffs that will allow products like butter to flow
more easily into the U.S. when domestic prices are
high relative to world prices. This will tend to cut the
extreme peaks in U.S. prices that have characterized
butter markets over the past few years as tariffs have
been high enough to essentially keep over-TRQ im-
ports from entering the U.S.
There is considerable evidence that additional
global market access achieved by a successful Doha
round agreement would increase world dairy prices
to levels closer to current U.S. prices. This would
minimize the negative effects of expanded market
access to the U.S. dairy sector and could even cause
U.S. milk prices to increase because of expanded ex-
port opportunities could outweigh additional market
access.
• Export Subsidies. Existing WTO rules prohibit
export subsidies on agricultural products unless they
are specified in a country’s commitment list. Subsi-
dies on eligible products were required to be cut
from base period (1986-1990) levels in both volume
and value terms. Developed countries were required
to cut the value by 36 percent and the volume by 24
percent in equal increments over the 1995 to 2000
period. Developing countries were required to cut the
value by 24 percent and the volume by 14 percent in
equal increments over the 1995 to 2004 period. Least
developed countries were not required to make any
46 DAIRY POLICY ISSUES
cuts. There are 25 WTO members who are able to
use export subsidies, but only for products on their
commitment lists.
An interim agreement in the Doha round of WTO ne-
gotiations calls for the elimination of all export sub-
sidies, including export credit programs, by 2013.
Subsequent proposals have sought a large cut in ex-
port subsidies early in the agreement period, fol-
lowed by an adjustment period before elimination of
all subsidies. Other proposals would allow greater
flexibility in the use of export subsidies for develop-
ing countries. Smaller developing countries who im-
port much of their food are seeking less aggressive
cuts to subsidies, fearing that large reductions could
affect food costs for their consumers. Although there
is general agreement to continue to promote food aid
for humanitarian purposes, there are concerns about
how to properly discipline food aid so that it is not
used by countries to primarily rid themselves of bur-
densome surpluses. The role of state trading enter-
prises and differences that exist relative to private
companies is also a point of contention under the ex-
port subsidy debate.
Proposals under consideration would make the Dairy
Export Incentive Program (DEIP) less important to
the U.S. dairy industry. Current levels of dairy prod-
ucts that can be exported under the DEIP are: butter
and butteroil, 21,097 metric tons; skim milk powder,
68,201 metric tons; and cheese, 3,030 metric tons.
Annual DEIP commitments begin on a July 1 year.
With further cuts in allowable DEIP exports, the
Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) would likely
purchase more nonfat dry milk during periods of sur-
plus production.
The larger issue under the export subsidy pillar for
the U.S. dairy industry is not the reduction in the
DEIP, but the likely effect on dairy product prices of
fewer subsidized exports from other countries. World
dairy prices should rise as a result of cutting export
subsidies. Analysis conducted by FAPRI examining
the U.S. proposal of October 2005 suggested that the
cut in EU subsidized exports would be large enough
to increase world dairy prices to U.S. levels. This
would limit the downside negative effects of changes
in U.S. domestic support and market access for dairy
products. Without export subsidy reductions, the
U.S. proposal would be negative for the U.S. dairy
industry.
• Domestic support. The main issue surrounding do-
mestic support programs is their tendency to stimu-
late domestic production. This can squeeze out
imports and provide motivation for a country to use
export subsidies to move excess product offshore,
lowering world prices. The WTO Uruguay Round
made a distinction between domestic support policies
that stimulate production and distort trade and pro-
grams that have only minimal effects on trade. This
categorization resulted in the creation of colored
“boxes” to represent the different types of domestic
support. Using a traffic light analogy, the green box
is used for domestic support that has minimal trade
effects and can be used freely. Examples of programs
that fall into this category are: research, infrastruc-
ture and payments to farmers that do not stimulate
production. Domestic support that has a direct effect
on production and trade was put into an amber box
and was to be cut under existing WTO rules. Pay-
ments made to farmers that required limiting produc-
tion to be eligible were defined to fall within the blue
box and did not require reductions. Rules were put in
place that countries must use to calculate a value of
the total domestic support each country provides pro-
ducers that includes direct support, input subsidies
and revenue transfers from consumers to producers.
This calculation became a country’s aggregate meas-
ure of support (AMS). Each country had to calculate
its base period (1986-1998) AMS and agree to make
cuts from that base period level. Developed countries
had to cut their AMS by 20 percent over the 1995-
2000 period while developing countries had to cut
their AMS by 13 percent over the 1995-2004 period.
For the U.S., the base period AMS was $23.9 billion
and the required 20 percent URAA reduction resulted
in an AMS ceiling in 2000 of $19.1 billion. There are
34 WTO members who have commitments to reduce
amber box spending in the URAA. The remaining
WTO members must keep domestic support within 5
percent of the value of production (10 percent for de-
veloping countries).
There have been several proposals in the Doha round
for reforms to domestic support. In nearly all cases,
the proposals have focused on further reductions or
outright elimination of amber box spending. A U.S.
proposal called for a 60 percent cut in domestic sup-
port which results in an AMS ceiling for the United
States below $8 billion. Other issues continue to be
debated regarding matters like de minimis rules and
further refinement of both the green and blue box
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definitions. Some countries worry about box shifting
as countries reduce amber box spending but offset
that decline with green box or blue box spending.
The AMS calculation for just the dairy price support
program in the Uruguay Round was more than $4.5
billion. The prospect of Doha Round-related cuts in
amber box spending was the primary reason that the
method of supporting milk prices was altered in the
2008 Farm Bill (see paper on the Dairy Product Price
Support Program).
The Northeast Interstate Dairy Compact was in-
cluded in the U.S. domestic support notifications and
suggests that new compact-like programs will also
fall into the amber box. The Milk Income Loss Con-
tract (MILC) program is also included in the U.S.
AMS notifications beginning in 2002. In 2002, the
dairy AMS level jumped to $6.3 billion with the ad-
dition of MILC spending.
MPC Imports
Milk Protein Concentrate (MPC) is a non-fat, high-
protein milk powder that is made by ultrafiltration
and drying of skim milk. It has similar uses to nonfat
dry milk (NDM), which is typically produced by
spray-drying skim milk, but has a higher protein con-
tent—40 to 90 percent compared to 34 to 36 percent
for NDM. Because of its higher protein and corre-
spondingly lower lactose relative to NDM, the use of
MPC to “standardize” cheese milk (optimize the fat-
to-casein ratio) enhances both the economics and the
technical efficiency of cheesemaking. MPC can only
be used in making cheeses and cheese foods that do
not have a U.S. Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) standard of identity. But MPC is also an in-
gredient in a wide array of other food products such
as frozen deserts, bakery and confectionery products,
sports and nutrition drinks and bars (energy bars),
and nutrition supplements.
Until recently, there was no MPC produced in the
United States, and production remains limited be-
cause of a lack of incentives. The Dairy Product
Price Support Program sets an intervention price for
NDM that generally makes it more profitable to
manufacture NDM than MPC. There is only a token
tariff (0.17 cents per pound) on imported MPC. Con-
sequently, as the demand for MPC has increased be-
cause of its functionality and low price per unit of
protein relative to NDM, U.S. imports have also in-
creased. The U.S. imported less than 10 million
pounds of MPC in the early 1990’s. Imports in 2005
were 172 million pounds valued at $223 million,
comprising nearly 10 percent of the total value of
U.S. dairy imports. Since then, imports have receded,
partly in response to growing domestic production.
In 2009, MPC import volume was 114 million
pounds while domestic production was 92 million
pounds.
To the extent that they substitute for each other, im-
ported MPC has caused displacement of domesti-
cally-produced NDM. Displacement is hard to
measure because of the lack of hard evidence on sub-
stitutability in many applications, especially newer
products that have always used MPC. UW research
estimated that the maximum displacement ranged
from 80 to 430 million pounds of NDM annually be-
tween 1997 and 2002. Government purchases of
NDM exceeded its estimated displacement by MPC
in each of these years. In other words, the govern-
ment would have purchased NDM under the support
program even if there had been no MPC imports.
Consequently, the producer price effect was minimal.
Large U.S. exports of NDM in response to strong
world market prices starting in 2004 resulted in no
government purchases, and expanded MPC imports
were used to supplement NDM supplies.
Under WTO rules, the U.S. has limited flexibility in
applying new tariffs and must compensate countries
that would be penalized by expanding tariffs beyond
what were agreed to under the Uruguay round. The
nature of compensation is subject to negotiation. It
could be a cash settlement for lost exports. More
likely, it would involve raising tariff-rate quotas or
lowering the over-quota tariff on other dairy products
the country exported to the U.S. This would probably
be cheese, which is a major export item for most
countries that export MPC to the U.S.
Future Role of the United States in Interna-
tional Dairy Trade
The United States substantially increased its role in
world dairy markets over the last decade, but it is un-
certain whether that will continue. Despite growth in
exports, international sales remain an auxiliary enter-
prise for most U.S. dairy companies. Dairy farmers
in the United States are ambivalent about expanded
global trade, focusing their attention more on re-
stricting U.S. imports than on increasing exports.
Both milk producers and manufacturers are appre-
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hensive about the price volatility associated with
world markets.
The graphs of cheese, butter and nonfat dry milk
prices below highlight the role that the U.S. has
played in global dairy markets. In the early 2000s,
domestic dairy product prices remained above world
prices as a result of large import tariffs and the dairy
price support program. With the rapid increase in
world dairy prices that began during 2007, the U.S.
found itself in a competitive position and willing to
commercially ship product into world markets. The
question the dairy industry must decide is one of
leaving current domestic programs intact and only
using world markets when prices rise above domestic
prices plus transportation or adjusting programs to
the point that the U.S. becomes consistent suppliers
0.00
0.50
1.00
1.50
2.00
2.50
U.S. Wholesale
Oceania
D
ol
la
rs
pe
rP
ou
nd
Jan 02 Jan 03 Jan 04 Jan 05 Jan 06 Jan 07 Jan 08 Jan 09 Jan 10
0.00
0.50
1.00
1.50
2.00
2.50
3.00
U.S. Wholesale
Oceania
D
ol
la
rs
pe
rP
ou
nd
Jan 02 Jan 03 Jan 04 Jan 05 Jan 06 Jan 07 Jan 08 Jan 09 Jan 10
Cheese Prices
Butter Prices
DAIRY POLICY ISSUES 49
50 DAIRY POLICY ISSUES
to other countries even in periods of low world
prices.
Becoming consistent suppliers may allow for much
large markets to be built than would be the case of
using world markets to move products only when
global prices are high. This is not a simple question
to answer and depends greatly on the global outlook
for dairy demand.
One issue that must be included in deciding this
strategy is exchange rates. The U.S. dollar has depre-
ciated against many currencies for much of the 2000s
which has made U.S. products cheaper in other coun-
tries’ currencies. Although most experts do not ex-
pect the U.S. dollar to strengthen in the next decade,
if it were to strengthen it could jeopardize the U.S.
position in world dairy markets.
A New View Regarding Choices for the U.S.
Industry
The Innovation Center for U.S. Dairy (IC) recently
commissioned a major study to sort through U.S.
dairy trade challenges and opportunities. A task force
consisting of IC board members actively engaged in
dairy exports was named to direct the study and Bain
& Company was contracted to conduct interviews
with a broad range of dairy sector stakeholders and
perform other analyses. The related report, entitled,
The Impact of Globalization on the U.S. Dairy In-
dustry: Threats, Opportunities, and Implications, was
released October 2009.
IC traced the following likely future scenario with
respect to world dairy trade and implications for the
U.S.:
• World demand for dairy products will grow rapidly,
primarily as a result of strong economic growth in
East and Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and North-
ern Africa. Internal milk production in these coun-
tries cannot keep pace with increased demand.
• The resulting net demand growth will exceed the
potential milk supply growth in traditional low-cost
dairy exporting countries (New Zealand and Aus-
tralia) despite higher world prices, resulting in a “la-
tent demand gap” forecast at 7 billion pounds milk
equivalent by 2013.
• The U.S. has the opportunity not only to help fill
this global demand gap, but also to benefit from dis-
placing imports with internal sources of product.
• To fully exploit this opportunity, U.S. exporters
would need to be consistent suppliers of high-quality
products in the form demanded by importers. Federal
dairy policy changes would be necessary as well.
• The window of opportunity afforded by the latent
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demand gap may be limited if non-traditional dairy
exporters—notably Brazil and Ukraine—success-
fully deal with existing constraints to expanded pro-
duction. But by committing to exports now, U.S.
firms may be able to thwart this new competition.
IC identified four strategic options for the U.S. to
pursue: Fortress USA, the status quo, consistent ex-
porter status, and global dairy player.
The Fortress USA option—exclusive focus on the
domestic market—was deemed infeasible because it
would require higher trade barriers and some form of
supply control to match domestic supply with de-
mand at acceptable farm-level milk prices. Restrict-
ing market access would violate existing WTO
commitments and a completed Doha round agree-
ment will likely further expand market access. Adop-
tion of a strong form of supply control was
considered a political long shot.
Maintaining the status quo is the easiest option be-
cause no changes are necessary and industry stake-
holders have become comfortable operating within
the current system. But the status quo would margin-
alize the U.S. role in world markets and run the risk
of increasing dairy imports and displacement of dairy
ingredients by non-dairy substitutes.
The global dairy player option would essentially
adopt the strategy employed by export-oriented
countries like New Zealand and Ireland, where major
dairy companies (e.g., Fonterra in New Zealand, and
Glanbia in Ireland) focus almost exclusively on ex-
port sales. These companies have developed exten-
sive trading relationships with importing countries
and have established elaborate networks of joint ven-
tures and direct foreign investments to source sup-
plies outside their headquarter countries. While seen
as a possible longer-term goal, the IC concluded that
seeking global player status was premature.
The recommended IC option for the U.S. dairy in-
dustry was the consistent exporter status. This would
involve an industry commitment to enhance dairy
companies’ trading skills and to manufacture prod-
ucts aligned with foreign buyers’ needs. It would also
require altering federal programs and regulations that
impede dairy exports and improving tools to manage
price risk.
More specifically, achieving consistent exporter sta-
tus would require that importers perceive the U.S as
a consistently reliable supplier of consistently high-
quality dairy products manufactured to their specifi-
cations and meeting the changing demands of their
consumers. Whether U.S. dairy companies are will-
ing to commit to the related changes in their business
practices is not clear. Even if they were, the presence
of the Dairy Product Price Support program stands in
the way of the U.S. being perceived as a reliable sup-
plier, since the Commodity Credit Corporation may
periodically represent a more lucrative sales outlet
for NDM, butter, and cheese than foreign buyers.
The IC report also suggested that existing FDA stan-
dards of identity could also stand in way of U.S.
companies being able to make the right products to
meet export demand.
Recognizing the potential risks associated with
world market price volatility, the IC report recom-
mended strengthening price risk management tools
available to dairy farmers and manufacturers. While
it did not identify methods of doing this, the report
was critical of the Federal Milk Marketing Order
system for increasing price volatility by limiting the
development of forward contracting and use of dairy
futures markets.
It is important to point out that the Innovation Center
globalization task force members represented major
cooperative and proprietary manufacturers of cheese,
butter and NDM, which, along with whey products
derived from cheese production, are the principal
U.S. dairy export items. Whether dairy farmers
would have come up with the same conclusions and
recommendations is an open question.
Regardless of the feasibility or the overall dairy in-
dustry acceptance of the IC strategy, the report pro-
vides a useful starting point for discussing the future
U.S. role in international dairy trade and how to sup-
port that role.
Endnotes
1 Trade data for the charts here are drawn from the
USDA-FAS Global Agricultural Trade System.
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